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Meindertsma: Retiring Workplace Tortious Interference Claims

PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
RETIRING WORKPLACE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
Donn C. Meindertsma
Are you a rung or two lower on the corporate ladder than you
expected to be at this point in your career? Sue your boss.
Suits by unhappy employees against supervisors or cubicle-mates
are nothing new. In at least one manifestation, however, the right to sue
coworkers over workplace disputes has developed in an ad hoc manner
based on an all-purpose tort theory, tortious interference. As a result of
this organic development, the law is unclear and in many respects
confounded by inconsistencies. The lack of clarity leaves employers and
employees guessing about the legal duties coworkers owe to each other
in the workplace.'
Courts should freshly examine the viability of claims that a
coworker tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs job. The common law
has long recognized that when a third party improperly interferes with an
established relationship between two others, the third party may be liable
for the damages caused. Application of this tort theory to coworker
disputes, however, is not the result of studied consideration whether
coworker tort actions are necessary or proper, insofar as courts rarely
pause to consider whether these claims should be available in the first
2
place.
* Mr. Meindertsma is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Conner & Winters, LLP. He
counsels and defends employers in all aspects of employment law. He graduated with a B.A. from
Calvin College and a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School. He is a member of the
District of Columbia Bar.
1. Alex Long, The DisconnectBetween At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference with
Business Relations: Rethinking Interference Claims in the Employment Context 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
491, 506-07 (2001) [hereinafter Long, The Disconnect]. This Article uses "coworker" to reference
peers as well as supervisors, managers, and executives.
2. See Brett J. Chessin, Individual Liabilityfor Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public
Policy: An Emerging Trend, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2013) (showing the wide swath
of courts that have changed the landscape of employment law by allowing claims based upon tort
theory seemingly without considering the widespread ramifications of allowing such claims).
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This Article contends that tortious interference claims are
inappropriate to settle conflicts between colleagues. In this context, the
tort conflicts with narrower legal causes of action tailored to resolve
workplace disputes, fails to efficiently promote societal interests, and
fails to provide adequate notice of the scope of duties owed by workers
to one another. Statutory and workplace-specific tort claims better
balance relevant interests and adequately protect employment rights.3
Part I reviews the legal landscape of employment claims and
summarizes the role of tortious interference claims in that context. Part
II discusses how courts attempt to apply the theory of tortious
interference when workers sue each other. Part III argues that courts
should pay their last respects to claims of tortious interference against
coworkers arising out of workplace disputes.4
I. THE LEGAL

LANDSCAPE

A. Case in Point

&

For the past two years now, Ryan did not get the annual
performance evaluation he hoped for. He believes his work for TD
Co. has been outstanding, but his supervisor, Mindy, gave him low
ratings. This has hurt his bank account more than his self-esteem: his
below-average performance review disqualifies him from a raise, a
bonus, and promotion opportunities.
Ryan theorizes that Mindy is trying to sabotage him because he is
an up-and-coming company star. He concludes he no longer needs to
tolerate Mindy's nonsense, so he sues her for bungling his relationship
with TD & Co. He claims that Mindy tortiously interfered with his
relationship with TD & Co.
The complaint alleges that Ryan's work met company expectations;
he reasonably assumed that the company would fairly compensate him
and consider him for advancement; Mindy does not like him; she gave
him poor evaluations to sabotage him; and she did so solely to preserve
3. See, e.g., Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 636 (Utah 2015) (holding the
preservation of an employee's right to self-defense in the workplace was a valid protectable right as
a means to properly balance workplace safety and employee rights).
4.

See infra Part Ill.

Employment-related interference claims may of course take other

forms, such as a claim that a former employer provided negative references that interfered with the
plaintiffs prospective employment, a claim that a company improperly poached its competitor's
staff, or a claim that a former employee breached a non-solicitation covenant. See generally BRIAN
M. MALSBERGER, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: A STATE-BY-STATE

SURVEY (4th ed. 2014) (demonstrating these types of claims).
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her own prospects for advancement. He demands a jury trial and
remedies, including remuneration for the raises and bonuses he did not
get due to Mindy's interference; an order barring Mindy from giving
him anything less than superior evaluations in the future; a promotion;
compensatory damages for his tarnished reputation and emotional
distress; and punitive damages.
While Mindy is confident in the evaluation ratings she gave Ryan,
she knows that no case is black and white. She also knows that Ryan
has some supporters who perceive his abilities more favorably than she
does. And what if the jury simply dislikes her and buys Ryan's goldenboy theory?
Still, Mindy did what a supervisor should: she held Ryan
accountable and advised him how to improve his performance. Mindy
also cannot imagine that the court will hold her personally responsible
for damages because any lost earnings would have come from the
company, not her. Plus, Mindy lacks the power to single-handedly
promote Ryan, so a court could not order her to promote him. Surely,
the court will see that the complaint is frivolous and throw this case out.
Whether the court will do so may hinge on the court's readiness to
recognize claims for tortious interference in workplace disputes.
B. Tortious Interference Claims in Context
Employment claims today include: a) modern causes of action
(mostly statutory) tailored to protect workers, while also balancing the
sometimes competing interests of employees, employers, and the public,
5
and b) pedigreed general tort theories applied to jobsite tribulations.
Some causes of action allow suits against coworkers; others only against
the employer.6
1.

Statutory Employment Claims

Modern employment protections derive primarily from statutes that
identify particular aims, such as to deter and remedy race, gender, and
age discrimination. 7 Statutes spell out the prohibited employment action
5. "The law of employment in the United States is a hotchpotch of constitutional provisions,
legislative dictates, administrative rules, and common law-of tort and contract-that varies widely
from state to state." Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement ofEmployment Law, 7

U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L., 279, 279 (2005).
6. See id. at 280.
7. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
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(e.g., whistleblower retaliation), identify (sometimes) who can be held
liable for a violation, specify the process for resolving the dispute, and
designate available remedies. 8 Statutes often impose procedural steps
designed to channel and streamline the resolution of disputes, such as an
abbreviated limitations period or a mandatory administrative process.9
The most well-known federal employee protection statutes establish
only corporate, not coworker, liability, and courts are likely to interpret a
law that prohibits "employers" from discriminating against employees to
permit suit only against the employer.'o State statutes sometimes track
their federal counterparts, but vary on whether suits against coworkers
are permitted.1' Where a statute fails to address whether coworkers
make proper defendants, courts have reached varying conclusions on the
question.
Legislatures are positioned to gather data and devise efficient paths
to resolve disputes.1 3 When enacting statutes, they presumably consider
costs and benefits from the relevant perspectives-commercial, public,
private, moral-and tailor the scope of liability and remedies to achieve
those interests.14 Where interests compete, they presumably attempt to
balance them. 's Among other societal objectives, a legislature might
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
9. See id. § 2000e-5(c); § 2000e-17.
10. See, e.g., Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (Title VII prohibits
discrimination only by "employers"; coworkers are not responsible for employment actions taken in
their individual capacities); United States ex rel. Golden v. Ark. Game & Fish Conm'n, 333 F.3d
867, 871 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that whistleblower retaliation claims under the False Claims Act
may not be brought against individuals).
11. E.g., Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 697 N.W.2d 851, 863 (Mich. 2005) (declining to follow
federal court interpretation of Title VII and holding that supervisors are subject to individual
liability under the analogous state civil rights act).
12. See, e.g., Mills v. Hankla, 297 P.3d 158, 171 (Alaska 2013) (holding that individual
employees cannot be held liable for hostile work environment sexual discrimination under Alaska
Human Rights Act); Furhmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc., 58 A.3d 1083, 1098 (Me.
2012) ("If the Legislature had intended to create individual supervisor liability it would have done
so explicitly in much clearer terms."); Elezovic, 697 N.W.2d at 867 (Weaver, J., dissenting in part)
("Had the Legislature intended the [Civil Rights Act] to impose liability on the individuals who
commit harassment, it would likely have done so in a more straightforward manner than by defining
'employer' to include an 'agent' of the employer.").
13. Johnston v. William E. Wood & Assocs., 787 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 2016) ("[T]he
legislature . .. is best situated to study the employment relationship and fashion appropriate
remedies to address specific problems or changing conditions.").
14. See id.
15. For example, common-law defamation claims have often been filed to challenge negative
employment references, but over time many states have enacted job reference immunity statutes
designed to protect the rights of employers to share information. See Yuan v. Johns Hopkins Univ.,
135 A.3d 519, 536 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), cert. granted, 144 A.3d 706 (Md. 2016) (applying
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wish to promote a business-friendly environment that offers limited
liability and clarity regarding the scope of potential employment
claims. 16 Alternatively, a state's political disposition might favor strong
deterrents against workplace unfairness and generous remedies, perhaps
to foster social equality.' 7 No legislature has enacted a statute that
restrains how supervisors may evaluate subordinates and provides a
cause of action against them for unfair reviews." Ryan has therefore
resorted to a tort claim.
2. Public Policy Claims
Almost all states recognize a tort action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.' 9 This claim is an exception to the legal
presumption that employment is at-will, available where the reason for
discharging an employee was so contrary to public policy as to be
actionable.2 0 Wrongful discharge claims may challenge "unlawful"
reasons for discharge, such as retaliation21 for filing a worker's
compensation claim, 22 or for refusing a superior's directive to violate a
law.23 They may also protect employee rights, such as the right to
24
engage in self-defense.
Maryland immunity law).
16. See, e.g., id. (explaining how an employer's liability is limited by an employee having to
show "actual malice" in order to bring a successful negative employment reference claim).
17. "Individual employment law can profitably be understood as pervasively promoting social
equality." Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REv. 225,
228 (2013).
18. See Lorene D. Park, Courts All Over the Map on Adverse Actions; Employers Should
Level

the

Terrain,

WOLTERS

KLUWER

(Feb.

16,

2015),

20

http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/ 15/02/16/courts-all-over-the-map-on-adverseemployment-actions-employers-should-level-the-terrain/.
19. See Bagenstos, supra note 17 at 262.
20. Finkin, supra note 5, at 293 ("The gravamen of the wrong is the harm 'to third parties and
society as a whole' that a discharge works in contradistinction to a wrong done the individual
alone.").
21. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 56 (2016) ("The termination itself must be
motivated by an unlawful reason or purpose that is against public policy. However, the fact that the
employee's discharge was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation does not support an action
for wrongful discharge if the jury does not find that the discharge was in violation of public policy
for either performing an act which public policy favored or for refusing to perform an act which
public policy condemned.").
22. "An early and pervasive use of the public policy exception arose in cases in which an
employee was terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim." Kenneth R. Swift, The Public
Policy Exception to Employment At-Will: Time to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 61 MERCER L. REV.
551, 559 (2010).
23. See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 29-30 (D.C. 1991).
24. Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 617 (Utah 2015) (explaining that an at-will
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Courts permit public policy claims only if the policy is clear, such
as when a statute expresses it.25 Courts have reasoned that this
limitation is justified because without it, judges would be making up
public policy as they go, thus treading upon the territory of
legislatures. 26 Public policies are "not found in the varying personal
opinions and whims of judges or courts, charged with the interpretation
and declaration of the established law, as to what they themselves
believe to be the demands or interests of the public." 27
Ryan considered a public policy claim against Mindy. In some
jurisdictions, courts limit this action to discharges. 28 One concern
leading to this limitation is the potential for widespread litigation:
Recognizing a retaliation tort for actions short of
termination could subject employers to torrents of
unwarranted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled
employees at every juncture in the employment process.
And why stop at demotions? If, as [plaintiff] argues, a
demotion raises the same policy concerns as a
termination, so too would transfers, alterations in job
duties, and perhaps even disciplinary proceedings. The
potential for expansion of this type of litigation is
enormous.29

Another court reasoned: "Subjecting each disciplinary decision of
an employer to the scrutiny of the judiciary would not strike the proper
balance between the employer's right to run his business as he sees fit
and the employee's right to job security." 3 0 Some states nonetheless
employee may maintain a wrongful termination claim where the employee is fired for engaging in
self-defense if the employee faced an imminent threat of serious bodily harm and was unable to
safely withdraw).
25. See, e.g., Carl v.. Children's Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1997) (Terry, J., concurring)
("[L]est we allow 'public policy' exceptions to swallow up the at-will doctrine, I would also hold
that the recognition of any such exception must be firmly anchored either in the Constitution or in a
statute or regulation which clearly reflects the particular 'public policy' being relied upon.").
26. Id.
27. Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

28. See Ludwig v. C & A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Mintz
v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("We know of no court
that recognizes the tort of wrongful failure-to-promote."); Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.,
645 N.E.2d 877, 882, 884 (Ill. 1994) (holding that a retaliatory discharge cause of action does not
extend to claims of retaliatory demotion or other employment actions short of discharge).
29. Ludwig, 960 F.2d at 43.
30. White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 408 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
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'

allow public policy claims based on personnel decisions short of
discharge, often reasoning that limiting claims to discharges would
simply encourage employers to punish workers in roundabout ways,
such as by demoting them. 3
Courts in most states have not yet decided whether public policy
32
A draft restatement
claims extend to grievances short of termination.
of employment law titles the claim as one for "wrongful discipline in
violation of public policy."

33

Under this proposal, an employee could

sue over any personnel decision "that significantly affects compensation
or working conditions," or other action "that is reasonably likely to deter
a similarly situated employee from engaging in protected activity." 3 4 In
other words, employees could bring a public policy claim based on any
"materially adverse" employment action.35
As Ryan's case suggests, the line between material and immaterial
adverse actions is thin. Might a rock bottom performance rating in one
area of job responsibility (e.g., "teamwork") be "materially adverse," or
must the overall evaluation score be unsatisfactory? Is consequential
pecuniary harm also required? In Ryan's case, the evaluations by Mindy
are hardly damning, but they have meaningfully impaired his
compensation and promotion opportunities for two years. If he has a
"wrongful discipline" public policy claim, a court might find Ryan's
harm meets the threshold.
But can Ryan bring a wrongful discipline claim against Mindy?
Mindy wrote the evaluations in her capacity as his supervisor. In some
states, a public policy claim is viable only against the employer.36
31. See Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Kan. 1997) ("We conclude that the
recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the
cause of action for retaliatory discharge."); see also Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 711
(Neb. 2007) ("If we fail to recognize a claim for retaliatory demotion, it would create an incentive
for employers to merely demote, rather than discharge, employees who exercise their rights. To
promote such behavior would compromise the act and would render illusory the cause of action for
retaliatory discharge.").
32.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMP'T LAW,

§ 4.01

reporters' notes, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
33. Id. § 4.01 cmt. a (emphasis added).
34. Id. § 4.01(b).
35. The U.S. Supreme Court established this "materially adverse" or "reasonably likely to
deter" standard in a case involving the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 60-61 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)
(holding that because wrongful discharge claims requires an "employer-employee relationship," a
nurse employed by a hospital could not bring a claim against a supervising doctor); Buckner v.
Atlantic Plant Maint. Co., 694 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Ill. 1998) ("[W]e hold that the only proper
defendant in a retaliatory discharge action is the plaintiffs former employer."); Reno v. Baird, 957
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Courts so holding reason that only the employer has an employment
relationship with its workers 37 and, furthermore, that "[flear of financial
responsibility for a potential lawsuit could discourage supervisors from
terminating employees in legitimate situations."08 According to one
commentator, the "overwhelming weight of the case law" excludes
coworkers from potential wrongful discharge/discipline liability. 3 9 In
some states, nonetheless, an employee may sue coworkers.40
Whether coworkers may be sued for wrongful discharge or
wrongful discipline is a question that courts sometimes resolve with
scant analysis. 4 1 A court may catalogue practical pros and cons by
reasoning that "individual liability promotes deterrence and better
decision making because it allows the active wrongdoer to be held
directly responsible"; 42 but on the other hand, it may dispose of a case
simply by the opposite reasoning that the risk of individual liability
could chill legitimate decision-making.4 3 A more legalistic analysis
considers what duty is owed to the employee, and a court may conclude
that any duty arises from the employment relationship itself, between the

P.2d 1333, 1348 (Cal. 1998) (ruling that where a statute establishes a public policy, and coworker is
not an "employer" under the statute, plaintiff may not sue the coworker for public policy wrongful
discharge), superseded by statute, CAL Gov'T CODE § 12940(j)(3) (West 2016), as recognized in
Martinez v. Michaels, No. CV 15-02104, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92180 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
37. See Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, 306 S.W.3d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) ("Only the
employer has the power to hire and fire, and supervisors merely exercise that power on the
employer's behalf.... Corporate employees cannot, in their personal capacity, wrongfully
discharge an employee because they have no personal authority to fire an employee."); Johnson v.
North Carolina, 905 F. Supp. 2d 712, 726 (W.D.N.C. 2012) ("Pursuant to established North
Carolina law, 'a plaintiff may only bring a wrongful discharge action against the plaintiffs
employer, not against the employer's agents (such as co-workers and supervisors)."'); DeCarlo v.
Bonus Stores, Inc., 989 So. 2d 351, 359 (Miss. 2008) (holding individuals acting in the course and
scope of their employment are not liable for retaliatory discharge).
38. Physio GP, 306 S.W.3d at 889.
39.

HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., 2 EMPLOYEE DIsMIsSAL LAW & PRACTICE 9-12.7 (5th ed. 2006).

40. See Vanburen v. Grubb, 733 S.E.2d 919, 924 (Va. 2012) ("Virginia recognizes a common
law tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of established public policy against an individual
who was not the plaintiffs actual employer but who was the actor in violation of public policy and
who participated in the wrongful firing of the plaintiff, such as a supervisor or manager."); Id. at
925 (Kinser, C.J., dissenting) ("Because the legal duty at issue in a claim for wrongful discharge
does not flow from one employee to another employee, it is irrelevant if a manager or supervisor
also engaged in the conduct that violated public policy.").
41. See, e.g., Myers v. Alutiiq Int'l Solutions, LLC, 811 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (D.D.C. 2011)
(showing how the court may apply a simple "decision making" balancing test to determine the
outcome of cases).
42. Id. (citations omitted). "The purposes of tort law are served by holding liable individual
supervisors as well as the employer institutionally." PERRIT, supranote 39, at 9-12.7.
43. Myers, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 268-69.
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employee and the employer, so coworkers may not be sued."
Assuming that Ryan filed his complaint in a jurisdiction that
permits suits for wrongful discipline (not just discharge) and permits
him to sue supervisors (not just his employer), a public policy claim still
has a fatal flaw. That claim is available only where the employment
action offends public policy. Had Ryan alleged that Mindy was giving
him undeservedly poor evaluations because he rebuffed demands by
Mindy to violate a law, he might have a claim. But Ryan only argues
that Mindy is out to get him because she is jealous of his potential for
corporate superstardom. This dispute involving Mindy's alleged selfcenteredness and Ryan's stalled career path is one in which "the public"
has no interest.
3.

Other Tort Causes of Action in the Employment Context

Other tort claims can, of course, arise from workplace
occurrences. 45 A worker punched in the face during a heated argument
in the break room might win damages for the battery.46 An employee
who slanders his boss might face a defamation suit.4 7 A worker who
engages in truly outrageous behavior that causes severe distress to a
colleague might be liable under a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 48 While claims of this type might sometimes serve
44. See id. (holding that public policy claims may be brought against individuals primarily
based on local precedent permitting tortious interference claims against coworkers); see also Brett J.

Chessin, Individual Liabilityfor Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy: An Emerging
Trend, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1345, 1354, 1365 (2013) (positing a trend toward recognizing
claims against individuals, but arguing that such actions should be available only if the individual's
conduct was extreme and outrageous).

45. See infra notes 46-48.
46. State law would determine the scope of the aggressor's liability and whether exclusive
workers' compensation remedies would bar a claim against the company. See, e.g., Redman Indus.
v. Lang, 943 P.2d 208, 212 (Or. 1997) (This court held that exclusivity of workers' compensation
barred tort claim against employer for an on-the-job assault by a coworker: "The normal work
environment necessitates that employees work together and exposes them to each other, based
solely on their employment status."); Eserhut v. Heister, 762 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. 1988) (holding that
workers' compensation law did not bar action against coworkers for harassment).
47. See Lurleen A. Manning, The Employer Strikes Back: A Quick Guide to Claims Against
Employees,

MASS.

B.,

http://www.massbar.org/publications/section-review/2004/v6-nl/the-

employer-strikes-back-a (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
48. Tort claims may also result from negligence, although, presumably, negligence claims
would typically name the employer as the defendant (as for example in a claim of failure to properly
supervise). See, e.g., Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 314 P.3d 613, 625 (Idaho 2013)
(allowing assistant principal's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim to proceed against
school district based on inconsiderate verbal remarks to him; questions of fact existed whether
school officials' conduct "exceeded that degree of inconsiderate verbal remarks to which an
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as a "garnish for a wrongful discharge claim, collateral torts are
sometimes the white meat of employment law, serving as the chief cause
of action where a wrongful discharge claim could not succeed." 49
Mindy did not "lie" about Ryan when she wrote his evaluations.
The narrative comments she made and the ratings boxes she checked
mostly expressed her subjective opinions, albeit perhaps as a "hard
grader"-although it remains Ryan's contention that Mindy's evaluation
of him was for the sole purpose of elevating herself. Ryan therefore
would have little chance of advancing a defamation case; in addition,
Ryan would need to overcome the qualified privilege for workplace
communications.
A court would dismiss a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, both because Mindy did not engage in
outrageous conduct and because her actions could not reasonably be
expected to cause Ryan severe emotional distress.50 Ryan is probably
out of luck-unless he has a viable claim that Mindy tortiously
interfered with his relationship with TD & Co.
4.

Tortious Interference Claims

Tortious interference is among the business torts long recognized
by the common law." If two parties have established duties to each
other under a contract, a third party should not be able, without penalty,
to interfere with that contract to the detriment of the parties. 52 Thus,
"tortious interference with contract" claims are recognized where a
contract between two parties was disrupted by the wrongful behavior of
a third party.5 3
ordinary person is expected to be hardened"). No cause of action exists for negligent interference
with relationships. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
[hereinafter, RESTATEMENT].
49. Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: "The Other White Meat" of

Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REv. 863, 864 (2000) [hereinafter Long, Tortious Interference].
50. See, e.g., Frogley, 314 P.3d at 625 (stating that in order to have a successful claim for
intentional emotional distress, the person must engage in outrageous conduct and the actions must
be reasonably expected to cause severe emotional distress).
51. An act is "tortious" if it is "of such a character as to subject the actor to liability" under
tort principles. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 6 (AM.

LAW INST. 1965).

52. See Walnut St. Assoc.'s v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 475 (Pa. 2011) ("Ours
is a free society where citizens may freely interact and exchange information. Tortious interference,
as a basis for civil liability, does not operate to burden such interactions, but rather, to attach a
reasonable consequence when the defendant's intentional interference was 'improper."').
53. See RESTATEMENT § 766 ("One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to
the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform
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Tortious interference claims are viable even if no formal contract
exists.5 4 Claims may be brought for interference with "business
relationships," even prospective ones.51 "The point of a business
relationship is to advance the interests of the parties involved. Tortious
interference protects the interests of parties to an agreement against
interference by outsiders, who would not be liable otherwise for
breach." 56 This variation of the claim goes by many titles, including
interference with economic advantage or prospective economic
advantage.5 7
Although most employment relationships are at will, courts have
not necessarily been consistent in labeling a breach of an at-will
relationship as a breach of contract or of a business relationship.5 ' The
distinction may be important because interference with a contract may
be viewed as a more serious matter than interference with an economic
relationship or a mere prospective one.5 9 In the context of disputes
between workers, this Article refers to the cause of action as a claim for
employment interference, although there is no well-recognized tort by

the contract.").

54. See, e.g., Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1971) ("We see no reason
whatever why an intentional interference with a prospective business relationship which results in

economic loss is not as actionable as where the relation is presently existing, although we recognize
that there well may be more difficult problems of proof in the latter situation.").
55. See RESTATEMENT § 766B ("One who intentionally and improperly interferes with
another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the

interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective

relation.").
56. Palm Beach Cty. Health Care Dist. v. Prof'1 Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d 1090, 1095 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
57. See Donastorg v. Daily News Publ'g Co., 63 V.I. 196, 279-80 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)
(observing that the cause of action "enjoys no less than twenty-four similar, yet distinct titles across
fifty-four jurisdictions").
58. See Lewis v. Or. Beauty Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430, 433 (Or. 1987).
59. See RESTATEMENT § 766 cmt. c ("The added element ofa definite contract may be a basis
for greater protection."); see also Popescu v. Apple, Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 306 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) ("[A] plaintiff alleging business interference must also show that the defendant's action
'was wrongful "by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself.' As a general rule, this
wrongfulness element is not required in a contract interference claim because contracts are entitled

to greater protection from interference." (quoting Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995)). On the other hand, if Ryan had a short-term employment contract with
TD & Co., a jury likely would view the harm to him from negative evaluations and lack of
promotion as less significant than would be the case if the term of his relationship was indefinite
and potentially lengthy. Conversely, if Ryan has a short-term job contract with TD & Co., a jury
likely would view the alleged harms as less significant than would be the case if might have bad
long-term opportunities for career advancement.
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that name. 60
Public policy and tortious interference theories are distinct but
overlap. 6 1 At least one court has stated that a public policy claim
represents the application of a tortious interference claim in workplace
disputes. 62 The interference is wrongful, and thus actionable, because it
offends public policy. 63 A key difference between the two theories, of
course, is who ends up in the complaint's caption: the employer for
violating public policy, or a coworker for interference.
The more the
defendant-coworker seems to be the corporation (e.g., the chief
executive), the more likely a court will recognize incongruence between
allowing an interference claim against the individual but not a public
policy claim against the entity. 6 5 "Subject to rare public policy
exceptions, employment at will can be terminated for any reason or for
no reason. We would do considerable damage to this familiar policy if
we permitted a tortious interference claim against an individual decision
maker who is indistinguishable from the corporation itself." 6 6
If tortious interference claims apply in the run of the mill
employment situation, Ryan may be in luck. Because Ryan is an at-will
employee, he does not have a viable claim that Mindy interfered with a
contract between Ryan and TD & Co., but he expected to continue
working for TD & Co. indefinitely. In fact, he expected to stride up the
corporate ladder right into the C-Suite. Mindy interfered, then, with his
ongoing employment relationship and his prospective bright career path.
60. Cf Dryden v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 734 N.E.2d 409, 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) ("Ohio
law recognizes both a claim of tortious interference with contractual (or business) relations and a
claim of wrongful interference with an employment relationship."); Hustler Cincinnati, Inc. v.
Cambria, 625 F. App'x 712, 720 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that "tortious interference with
employment relations [is] recognized as a distinct tort under Ohio law.").
61. See Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988); see also Long,
Tortious Interference, supra note 49, at 874 (stating that of all collateral torts, "none bears as close a

relationship to a wrongful discharge claim as tortious interference .....").
62. "We believe a cause of action should exist for tortious interference with the contract of
hire when the discharge serves to frustrate a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state."
Springer, 429 N.W.2d at 560.
63. See id. at 560-61.
64. See Boers v. Payline Sys., 918 P.2d 432, 437 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (The case notes that
plaintiff could not bring a public policy claim against his supervisor, but "[t]he allegation of an
improper purpose was sufficient without consideration of the public policy issue" to state an
interference claim.).

65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Harrison v. Netcentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622, 632 (Mass. 2001) ("Where the corporation
and the individual defendant are indistinguishable, including without limitation, where the
individual is the corporation's sole stockholder, it would exalt form over substance to hold that the
corporation could not be sued successfully in contract, but that the corporation's alter ego could be
sued successfully in tort.").
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How will a court analyze Ryan's claim that Mindy gave unfair
appraisals of his performance for the sole purpose of protecting her own
career opportunities?
II.

APPLICATION

OF

TORTIOUS

INTERFERENCE

ELEMENTS

IN

COWORKER DISPUTES

Like any tort claim, an employment interference lawsuit begins
with a complaint that identifies the elements of the claim and offers
factual gloss sufficient to satisfy pleading rules.67 The claim's elements
vary from state to state but most often are identified by reference to the
68
The
appropriate provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
satisfy
cannot
plaintiff
the
why
to
demonstrate
attempt
will
then
defense
each of the elements. 69 That routine rarely, if ever, leads to predicate
consideration by the court, or even the defense, whether that tort theory
should apply in suits between coworkers and, if so, whether its
traditional elements warrant refinement in such disputes.
Because employment is predominantly at will, courts most often
resolve employment interference claims by resorting to the
Restatement's provision on interference with relationships rather than
contracts.70 A job holder's interest is "primarily an interest in future
relations between the parties" although "he has no legal assurance of
them." 71 "For this reason, an interference with [a job] interest is closely
72
analogous to interference with prospective contractual relations."
Section 766B of the Restatement defines this claim as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with
another's prospective contractual relation (except a
contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of
the relation, whether the interference consists of (a)
inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation or (b)
67. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating the typical structure of an employment interference lawsuit).
68. See, e.g., Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends Sch, 128 A.3d 1023, 1039 (D.C. 2015) ("The
District of Columbia derives the elements of tortious interference with a contract and/or prospective
advantage from the Restatement.").
69. See Harrison,744 N.E.2d at 632.
70. See Frank C. Cavico, Tortious Interference with Contract in At-Will Employment Context,
79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 503, 505 (2002).

§ 766 cmt.

g.

71.

Id. at 513; RESTATEMENT

72.

Cavico, supra note 70, at 513; RESTATEMENT
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preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.73
Paraphrased for coworker suits, this standard creates liability for a
coworker who "prevent[s]" an employee from "acquiring" a job or
"continuing" his employment relationship by "intentionally and
improperly interfer[ing]."
Section 766B's expansive definition of the claim-thou shalt not
improperly interfere-offers scant practical direction.75 Noting the
difficulty its own courts had encountered in defining what conduct is
improper, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
[T]he core concept of liability-what conduct is
prohibited-has never been clearly defined. Texas
courts have variously stated that a defendant may be
liable for conduct that is "wrongful," "malicious,"
"improper," of "no useful purpose," "below the
behavior of fair men similarly situated," or done "with
the purpose of harming the plaintiff," but not for
conduct that is "competitive," "privileged," or
"justified," even if intended to harm the plaintiff.
Repetition of these abstractions in the case law has not
imbued them with content or made them more useful,
and tensions among them, which exist not only in Texas
law but American law generally, have for decades been
the subject of considerable critical commentary.76
Nor has section 766B brought uniformity to application of this
claim.n7

Courts rely on the guidance of the Restatement to varying

degrees, and may ignore or modify its provisions as they wish.78 If a
state's supreme court has not explicitly adopted a Restatement provision,
appellate courts will be uncertain to what extent they should rely on it.
Courts that adopt the Restatement do not necessarily agree on what its

73. Id. § 766B.
74. Id.
75.

Id. at cmt. a.

76. Wal-Mart Stores v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 712-13 (Tex. 2001).
77. See id. at 720.
78. See id. at 720-21 (showing how the court ignored the Restatement's notions of "malice"
and "justification" and modified the meaning of "improper" when it comes to conduct that is
actionable).
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elements mean. 79 As a result, the law of employment interference is
anything but uniform. The following summarizes judicial application of
the claim.
A. The Protectable Relationship: Is the Hope of Continuing
Employment Enough?
The Restatement defines this claim as protecting a "prospective
contractual relation[ship]." 80 Is an employee's hope that, because he has
a job today, he will have that job tomorrow, the type of relationship
81
worthy of protection? The general answer is yes.
Rarely do employment interference claims falter on the requirement
The tort claim protects ongoing
of a protected relationship. 8 2
83
relationships, even if not strictly contractual. Courts generally assume
84
that employees have a protectable interest in continued employment.
A comment in the Restatement states that a contract terminable at-will
"is valid and subsisting, and the defendant may not improperly interfere
with it." 85 "In protecting at-will employment relationships, courts have

reasoned that although an employment relationship is terminable at will,
the fact that a relationship is at the will of the employer and employee
does not make it at the will of others who wrongfully interfere with the
relationship." 86
New York law is more restrictive in that a termination, without
more, will not support an employment interference claim against

79.

See id. at 723-24.

80.

RESTATEMENT

81.

See

Charles

Exceptions, BUREAU

§ 766B.
Muhl,

J.
OF

The
LAB.

Doctrine:

Employment-At-Will
STAT.

3

(Jan.

Three

Major
2001),

http://www.bls.gov/opub/mir/2001/01/artlfull.pdf.
82. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 124-27 (1998).
83. See id. at 126-27 (relying on recognized protection of at-will employment relationships in
the tort context in holding that job interference may give rise to federal civil rights claim).
84. See id.
85. See RESTATEMENT § 766 cmt. g ("A similar situation exists with a contract that, by its
terms or otherwise, permits the third person to terminate the agreement at will. Until he has so
terminated it, the contract is valid and subsisting, and the defendant may not improperly interfere
with it. . . . One's interest in a contract terminable at will is primarily an interest in future relations
between the parties, and he has no legal assurance of them. For this reason, an interference with this
interest is closely analogous to interference with prospective contractual relations."). But see Favrot

v. Favrot, 68 So. 3d 1099, 1111 (La. App. 2011) (stating that Louisiana does not recognize a cause
of action for tortious interference with at-will employment).

86. Hoschler v. Kozlik, 529 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995). The Nebraska Supreme
Court later ruled that "[w]e agree with and adopt this holding and the rationale upon which it is
based." Huff v. Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Neb. 2000).
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coworkers. 87 "Inasmuch as the length of employment is not a material
term of at-will employment, a party cannot be injured merely by the
termination of her employment." 8 8 "Absent injury independent of
termination, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for what is, in essence,
an alleged wrongful discharge claim in the guise of a tort claim against
her fellow employees and supervisor., 89 In contrast, in a slightly
different context, a California appeals court recently held that an at-will
employee is "not required to allege that he was directly harmed by an
independently wrongful act" beyond the interference with his job. 90
What if the employee claiming interference had a record of poor
performance prior to his discharge? His employment relationship was
"subsisting" (perhaps barely), but was it "valid" and worthy of
protection? In that instance, the employee's expectation of continuing
employment should be a glimmer of hope at best. In one case, the court
stated that "an at-will employee who enjoys the confidence of his or her
employer has the right to expect that a third party will not wrongfully
undermine the existing favorable relationship." 91 While poor performers
might not have an interference claim, courts have not often discussed
this nuance.9 2 Of course, Ryan contends that the evaluations Mindy has
given him are themselves unfair, a contention that would complicate
resolving whether he "enjoyed the confidence" of TD & Co.
Some courts temper their readiness to recognize a protectable
relationship by imposing more demanding requirements to satisfy other
elements of an employment interference claim. 9 3 The Iowa courts have
87. See Barcellos v. Robbins, 50 A.D.3d 934, 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Marino v. Vunk, 39 A.D.3d 339, 340-41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("Plaintiff
cannot be allowed to evade the employment-at-will rule by recasting her cause of action in the garb
of tortious interference with her employment."). Many New York decisions emphasize the courts'
steadfast refusal to recognize "pathways around" the at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Smalley v. Dreyfus
Corp., 882 N.E.2d 882, 884 (N.Y. 2008).
90. Popescu v. Apple, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 307 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). Popescu alleged
that Apple wrongfully persuaded his employer to fire him. Id. at 307. His claim was not against a
coworker. Id.
91. Feaheny v. Caldwell, 437 N.W.2d 358, 364 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
92. But see, e.g., Eakins v. Hanna Cylinders, L.L.C., 42 N.E.3d 858, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(holding the "plaintiffs level of performance was not among the contract's terms and was not a
basis for termination"); Berutti v. Dierks Foods, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that "the level of performance here was not within the contract terms nor was it the basis
for discharge for a cause which the law would impose"). These cases seem to suggest that if the
necessary level of performance is included in the contract's terms, employees may have no
interference claim when terminated.
93. See, e.g., Gray v. Harding, 807 N.w.2d 296, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (noting the
interference has to be "improper"); Compiano v. Hawkeye Bank & Tr., 588 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Iowa
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said that an at-will employee must prove not simply that the coworker
intentionally and improperly interfered, but did so "with the sole or
94
predominant purpose to injure or financially destroy" the plaintiff.
That broken at-will employment relationships may give rise to a
claim of tortious interference does not mean that a plaintiff will recoup
meaningful remedies. 9 5 According to the Restatement, "[t]he fact that
the contract is terminable at will . . . is to be taken into account in

determining the damages that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of its
breach." 96 Once the employer has decided to end an at-will relationship,
whether and for how long the employee would have continued to work is
a matter of speculation. 97 Some courts have held that a prevailing
employee is entitled only to nominal damages from coworkers for
98
employment interference absent unique circumstances.
B. Into the Breach: What is Actionable "Interference"?
Another topic raised by employment interference claims is the
99
degree of interference required to support a claim. Must the plaintiff
In our
lose his job, or is something less dramatic actionable?
employment
and
income
of
loss
the
claims
Ryan
hypothetical,
opportunities, among other things. But he still has the same duties and
compensation he agreed to when he accepted his job offer. In that sense,
there was no breach. Ryan's claim focuses on what might have been.

1999) (noting "to recover for interference with prospective business relations, a plaintiff must prove
the defendant acted with the sole or predominant purpose to injure or financially destroy the
plaintiff') (emphasis in original).
94. Compiano, 588 N.W.2d at 464; Gray, 807 N.W.2d at 13 (applying the standard to an atwill employee's interference claim).
95. Health Call v. Atrium Home & Health Care Servs., Inc., 706 N.W.2d 843, 859 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005) (Sawyer, J., concurring in part) ("The trial court ... must asset the merits of each
individual case to determine if the plaintiff.. . has made a sufficiently tangible showing of damages
to warrant allowing the jury to consider an award of more than nominal damages.").
96.

RESTATEMENT

§ 766

cmt. g.

97. See Health Call, 706 N.W.2d at 857 (discussing this speculation in the context of
determining lost profits).
98. But see id at 857 (holding that "a blanket rule limiting recovery to nominal damages as a
matter of law in all actions arising out of or related to the termination of at-will contracts is not
legally sound"); Everton v. Williams, 715 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Health
Call to employment at will relationships but expressing "no opinion on whether, in this case, there
exists a tangible basis on which to assess future damages that is not overly speculative"). Both of
these courts overruled lower court decisions limiting the prevailing plaintiff to nominal damages
only.
99. Compare RESTATEMENT § 766B, with Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d
62, 77 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing a claim that is not actionable).
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Although courts have not drawn particularly clear lines on this
topic, actions short of discharge have been litigated.100 An improper
interference that causes an employee not to be hired in the first place is
likely actionable because the tort protects against impairment of
prospective relationships and because, as noted above, the Restatement
advises that inducing an employee not to "enter into" a relationship is
actionable.'0 o On the other hand, a plaintiff claiming that she would
have gotten a job absent interference did not state a claim where she did
not have a job offer in hand and had not even been offered an interview.
In that case, the expectation of employment was "mere speculation" and
the business expectancy was no more than "a subjective hope." 1 0 2
Restatement section 766B does not further indicate what degree of
breach is necessary.1 03 Section 766A, comment a, states that liability
attaches where one intentionally interferes with a plaintiffs performance
of his own contract "either by preventing that performance or making it
more expensive or burdensome."'0 That provision, however, addresses
interference with the plaintiffs performance of his own obligations. 05
Nonetheless, plaintiffs have successfully advanced interference claims
against coworkers based on the contention that harassment forced them
to resign.1 0 6 In one case, the court rejected the defense's argument that
the plaintiff breached the contract because she quit. 107 Such a claim may
be viable even if the defendant did not intend to force the employee to
resign.'os As one court summarized, an interference claim does not
require intent to terminate, but merely intent to interfere with
employment.' 09
Some courts adopt the "material impairment" standard that applies

100. See Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 878, 882 (Il. 1994)
(discussing "whether a cause of action should be recognized which is predicated on an employer's
alleged retaliation against an employee who is not discharged from employment but rather is
allegedly demoted or discriminated against for asserting rights under the Workers' Compensation
Act" but declining to extend existing doctrine to "retaliatory demotion").

§ 766B.

101.

RESTATEMENT

102.

Kerr, 824 F.3d at 77.

103.

RESTATEMENT

§ 766B

(discussing only interference with another's prospective contract).

104. See Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
105. Id.
106. See Boyle v. Bos. Found., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D. Mass. 1992).
107. Id. at 630.
108. See id.
109. Wertz v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 790 So. 2d 841, 845-46 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
a jury question on a tortious interference claim when plaintiffs former employer would not permit
him to work for a subcontractor on its premises, resulting in his termination by the subcontractor);
Morris v. Young, No. 1:14-CV-136-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 2354642, at *4 (N.D. Miss. May 3, 2016).
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10
in discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful discipline cases.o One
court, for example, permitted the employee to pursue an interference
claim to challenge the denial of a pay increase."' A disciplinary action
12
that could result in termination may constitute actionable interference.1
On the other hand, an employee who transferred to another department
to escape alleged harassment did not show a breach because she did not
113
incur any monetary loss.

"Bullying" might also support an employment interference claim.114
A federal court recently permitted an employee to pursue a claim against
her superiors, alleging they more closely scrutinized her work than the
work of others, more frequently criticized her, screamed at her, and gave
her a negative performance appraisal.' 15 On the other hand, coworker
ostracism has been deemed outside the scope of a tortious interference
claim." 6
C. The Third Party Element: How Strange Must the "Stranger" to
the Work Relationship Be?
Only a "stranger" to an employment relationship can meddle with
Yet, applying the seemingly straight-forward principle that
it."
interference claims require a third party "become[s] more complicated"
when the "party alleged to have interfered is a supervisor or coemployee."" 8 The complication arises because companies can only act
7

110.

Levee, 729 N.E. 2d at 222 ("[W]here a third party's conduct substantially and materially

impairs the execution of an employment contract, frustrating an employee's expectations under her
contract and making performance of her contractual duties more burdensome, the inducement of

breach element of a claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship is satisfied.").
111. See id.
112. Morris, 2016 WL 2354642, at *4.
113. See Koehler v. Cty. of Grand Forks, 658 N.W.2d 741, 748 (N.D. 2003) ("Under
[Restatement section] 766A, a plaintiff may only recover pecuniary loss resulting from the
interference with contract.").

114. See Jon D. Bible, The Jerk at Work: Workplace Bullying and the Law's Inability to
Combat It, 38 EMP. REL. L.J. 32, 39 (2012) (discussing use of interference claims to remedy
bullying).
115. Burton v. Cmty. & Econ. Dev. Ass'n of Cook Cty., Inc., No. 15-C-4556, 2016 WIL
3027901, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2016).
116. Eserhut v. Heister, 812 P.2d 902, 904 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
117. Atlanta Market Center Mgmt. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278, 283 (Ga. 1998).
118. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 737 (D. Neb. 2014); see also
Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)
("Tortious interference takes an intriguing turn in the employment context. Common sense suggests
that an employee may not sue her employer for interfering with its own contract, and the case law
verifies this intuition. Despite the employer's immunity, however, a supervisor may be personally
liable if he tortiously interferes with a subordinate's employment relationship. This seeming
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through their employees. Coworkers are agents of the employer, and,
under traditional laws of agency, agents are not third parties.l 9
Courts favor varying approaches in tackling this complication.1 2 0
Although those approaches cannot be neatly binned, and although court
opinions occasionally conflate other elements of interference claims with
the third-party inquiry, the following lines of attack are identifiable.
1. Whether the Defendant was Outside the Scope of "the
Relationship"
Though a relatively rare occurrence, now and then a court will
flatly assert that an employee's supervisor or a corporate officer is not a
third party. 12 ' The Georgia Supreme Court has held that "to be liable for
tortious interference with contractual relations the defendant must be a
stranger to both the contract and the business relationship giving rise to
and underpinning the contract." 22 That approach "reduce[s] the number
of entities against which a claim of tortious interference with contract
may be maintained." 23 Because coworkers are part of the job scene,
they are within the relevant relationship, and not third parties under this
approach. 124
A Florida decision similarly held that a tortious interference claim
is available only if the interference was "unrelated" to the relationship

paradox has led the Massachusetts courts to construct a matrix of rules designed to ensure against
irrational results.").
119. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 737; see generally John Alan Doran, It Takes Three to
Tango: Arizona's Intentional Interference with Contract Tort and Individual Supervisor Liability in

the Employment Setting, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 477, 483 (2003); Long, Tortious Interference, supra note
1, at 506-07 ("One area in which courts have demonstrated a frustrating lack of consistency is in the
assessment of one of the most basic requirements of an interference claim-whether there are
actually three parties involved.").
120. See infra notes 122, 125, 127, 137 and accompanying text.
121. D'Agostino v. Musical Heritage Soc., No. L-4886-09, 2015 WL 5090862, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 20, 2015) (ciations omitted) ("Because Cilento was D'Agostino's
supervisor at MHS, he cannot be said to have tortiously interfered with D'Agostino's relationship
with MHS. '[I]t is "fundamental" to a cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective
economic relationship that the claim be directed against defendants who are not parties to the
relationship."'); Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 603 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)
("[W]hile acting as Farrow's supervisor, [defendant] was Hospital's agent, not a third party.").
122. Atlanta Market Ctr. Mgmt. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278, 283 (Ga. 1998).
123. Id.at610.
124. See Brathwaite v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 729 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
("It is true that actions taken by Quinn while employed by Grady as Brathwaite's manager cannot
support the tortious interference claim because, when Quinn took those actions, she was not a
stranger to the employment contract.").
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between the plaintiff and defendant. 12 Only a true stranger to the
12 6
In California, "as
relationship may be properly sued for interference.
a matter of public policy 'except where a statutory exception applies, an
employee or former employee cannot sue other employees based on their
7
conduct relating to personnel actions."' 1 2 This doctrine immunizes
coworkers from employment interference claims whether or not they are
supervisors. 12 8 Thus, Ryan would not have a claim against Mindy there
because her evaluations of Ryan were related to personnel actions.
2. The Defendant's Place on the Corporate Ladder
Hierarchy matters. 129 Generally speaking, it is more difficult to
sustain an employment interference claim against a chief executive or
other top officers than against coworkers lower in the chain of
command. 130 Applying an alter ego theory, some courts find that
13 1
corporate officers "are" the company and therefore not third parties.
Often, however, this alter ego approach is tempered by other factors
132
Some courts have held
discussed below, such as the officer's motive.
that the defendant's status as an officer makes no difference to
liability.

133

125. Palm Beach Cty. Health Care Dist. v. Prof Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d 1090, 1095 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
126. Id. at 1094 ("Under Florida law, a defendant is not a stranger to a business relationship,
and thus cannot be held liable for tortious interference, when it has a supervisory interest in how the
relationship is conducted or a potential financial interest in how a contract is performed.").
127. Schneider v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., No. B186998, 2006 WL 3352845, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 2006) (unpublished) (quoting Sheppard v. Freeman, 67 Cal. App. 4th 339, 341-42 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998)). Sheppard was an appellate division decision, which federal courts in California have
largely declined to follow. See, e.g., May v. Semblant, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01576, 2013 WL
5423614, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013).
128. Sheppard, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-17.
129. Whether shareholders who interfere with an employee's job may be considered third
parties is beyond the scope of this article. See D'Andrea v. Calcagni, 723 A.2d 276, 276-278 (R-I.
1999) (holding that an at-will employee was permitted to bring interference claim against a
"minority shareholder with no official responsibilities").
130. See infra notes 131-32.
131. Davis v. Ricketts, 765 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Nebraska law).
132. Id. ("Even if his actions were taken out of ill-will, he was still acting in his capacity as
CEO, and there is no claim for tortious interference."); see also French v. Oxygen Plus Corp., No.
3:13-0577, 2015 WL 846743, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted in relevantpart, 2015 WL 1467175 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2015) (asserting that the officer
"acted maliciously or in her own interest" insufficient to make the officer a third party).
133. Boers v. Payline Sys., 918 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
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3. Whether the Defendant's Conduct was Outside the Scope of
Employment
Courts most commonly consider whether coworkers acted within or
outside the scope of their employment to assess if they are third parties
liable for interference.1 34 In this respect, courts consider what the
coworker was doing when he engaged in the allegedly tortious
conduct. 135
Notwithstanding the attention some courts pay to hierarchy, courts
apply the scope-of-employment test even to high ranking officials. 136
[W]hen directors or officers act outside the scope of.
their official capacity, they no longer act as agents of the
corporation and therefore act as a third party. Directors
and officers who act outside the scope of their official
duties therefore can be held personally liable for tortious
interference with a contract.' 37
Of course, the higher up the management chain, the broader, typically,
the defendant's authority to act as a company agent. 38
In one straightforward case, a court dismissed the plaintiffs claim
that her manager set an impossible sales quota so he could fire her. 39
"The action of increasing the Plaintiffs sales quota was within the scope
of [defendant's] duties as her manager. As such, this action cannot form
the basis of a claim for tortious interference with the Plaintiffs
employment." 4 0 Some Ohio decisions similarly follow the rule that if
the alleged interference involved actions taken by the accused coworker
within the scope of his duties, including monitoring or supervising a
subordinate, no tortious interference claim lies.141 Internal complaints
134. See infra notes 135, 137.
135. It is "conceptually incoherent" to permit a plaintiff to recover against a coworker for
intentional interference while at the same time imputing liability to the employer for the
misconduct. A coworker cannot simultaneously act outside the scope of employment and as an
agent of the company. See Mailhiot v. Liberty Bank & Tr., 510 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987).
136. Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs, 845 N.E.2d 130, 138 (Ind. 2006).
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 139.
139. Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 1:25-CV-84-TL5, 2015 WL 789773, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 25,
2015), aff'd, 818 F.3d 274 (7th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at *5.
141. See, e.g., Jones v. Wheelersburg Local Sch. Dist., No. 12CA3513, 2013 WL 4647645, at
154 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2013).
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by peers about the plaintiffs conduct are unlikely to support
employment interference claims because such complaints are within the
scope of their employment. 14 2
How a court defines the scope of a defendant's duties necessarily
influences the outcome of its third-party analysis.1 4 3 One court framed
the inquiry as follows: "The [defendant] must be engaged in some type
of work that is assigned to him or her in the general sense of doing
something to serve the employer." 1" In our hypothetical, Mindy was
responsible to complete Ryan's performance appraisals and thus acted
within the scope of her duties. She was doing "some type of work that
[was] assigned" to her, and in that sense was not a third party.
The scope-of-employment standard is a logical approach to the
third-party question, in that coworkers are "immune," so to speak, from
employment interference claims in the first place only because they are
agents of the employer. 145 But this standard requires courts to import
agency concepts developed to address altogether unrelated issues. 14 6 In
the employment setting alone, agency law is used to address disputes
ranging from employer liability under worker's compensation schemes,
wage payment obligations, personal injury liability, and more.147
Whether agency standards should apply as a matter of policy is rarely if
ever discussed.
Inevitably, the interfering coworker may have acted partly within
the scope of his job duties but partly not. Yet, particularly in these dualrole cases, the inquiry whether the defendant was a third party may
easily shift to a focus on the defendant's motive-the question becoming
what was the defendant thinking rather than what was he doing.1 4 8
142. McHenry v. Lawrence, 66 A.D.3d 650, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that "coworkers were acting within the scope of their employment when they brought their concerns about
the plaintiffs behavior and ability to perform her job to the attention of the managing attorney and
the human resources administrator").
143. See Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs, 845 N.E.2d 130, 138 (Ind. 2006).
144. Wilson v. St. Luke's Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-00122-BLW, 2014 WL 7186811,
at *12 (D. Idaho Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting Wooley Tr. v. DeBest Plumbing, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (Idaho
1999)).
145. See Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1256 ("[T]he phrases 'scope of employment' and 'course of employment' take
on different shades of meaning depending on whether the issue is an injured employee's claim
under the Worker's Compensation Act or the 'fellow servant' rule under that Act, not to mention
respondeat superior.").

148. Graham v. Hubbs Mach. & Mfg., 92 F. Supp. 3d 935, 944 (E.D. Mo. 2015) ("While the
allegations that Benward was motivated by his personal interests may suffice to establish absence of
justification, the fact remains that under controlling Missouri law, Benward was an agent of Hubbs
Machine at the time he made the statements that led to her termination. As such, Benward cannot be
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Ryan, of course, would like a court to focus on his argument that Mindy
was ill-motivated in rating his performance, not on whether giving a
performance evaluation was within the scope of Mindy's duties.1 49
4. The Defendant's Objective and the Interests Served by His
Conduct
Although courts do not necessarily frame the inquiry this way, they
often consider the defendant's objective in making a personnel
decision. 50 This approach is something of a hybrid between the scope
of employment inquiry (above) and the malice inquiry (below). 151 The
focus is less on what the defendant was doing or why he was doing it,
and more on who was the beneficiary of the alleged tortious conduct.1 52
For example, courts following the provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency consider whether the coworker's actions were
"actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve" the employer."'
In
some states, the plaintiff needs to prove that the coworker took "actions
for his or her own personal benefit, or for the benefit of an entity other
than the employer.'" 54 Some courts ask if the coworker intended to
serve solely personal interests.155 For example, a defendant's interest
might be solely personal if his conduct was meant to benefit a side
business he runs.

held liable for interfering with plaintiffs business relationship with the company.").
149. California's bar against employment interference lawsuits based on personnel actions
does not depend on whether the defendant was acting within his scope of employment. Sheppard v.
Freeman, 67 Cal. App. 4th 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
150. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801, at *5
(D. Neb Dec. 10, 2014).
151. See Wilson v. St. Luke's Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-00122-BLW, 2014 WL
7186811, at *12 (D. Idaho Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting Wooley Tr. V. DeBest Plumbing, 983 P.2d 834,
838 (Idaho 1999)); see also infra text accompanying notes 163-65. Compare Wilson v. St. Luke's
Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-00122-BLW, 2014 WL 7186811, at *12 (D. Idaho Dec. 16,
2014) (quoting Wooley Tr. v. DeBest Plumbing, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (Idaho 1999)), with Porter v.
Oba. Inc., 42 P.3d 931, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
152. Bussing, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 171801 at *17.
153.

Id. at *17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§

228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)).

Bussing noted that the Third Restatement of Agency refined this test and provides that an act is not
within the scope of employment "when it occurs within an independent course of conduct that is not
intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer." Id. at *6 n.3 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 7.07

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006)).

154. Huff v. Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461, 470 (Neb. 2000) (holding that acting for personal
interests establishes that the coworker is a "third party").
155. Koehler v. Packer Grp., Inc., 53 N.E.3d 218, 239-40 (111. App. Ct. 2016) (holding that
defendants are liable only if they acted "solely out of self-interest"); Reed v. Mich. Metro Girl Scout
Council, 506 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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It may be difficult to separate the alleged wrongdoer's objective
from his motive, and the terminology used in court opinions can be
imprecise. Nonetheless, the interests test promises to involve a more
objective analysis. 156 A finder of fact does not need to determine what
considerations subjectively motivated the defendant, but instead may
consider whether his conduct could reasonably be viewed as serving the
interests of the employer.1 5 7 This inquiry could produce outcomes
similar to the inquiry discussed above as to whether the defendant "in
the general sense" was "doing something" to serve the employer.158
Still, answering that question may not be simple: Does a supervisor's
harsh, perhaps unfair, evaluation benefit the employer?
A question that usually escapes discussion is who determines what
the employer's "interests" are (or should be). Does an employee present
a triable issue of fact by contesting the wisdom of the defendant's
claimed company interests? One court required the plaintiff to prove
that the coworkers she sued "were not acting in furtherance of their view
of' the company's interests.159 On the other hand, an employee might be

able to argue that because she was a good employee, it could not have
been in the company's interests for a superior to criticize or fire her 160o
which suggests that the plaintiffs view of what is in the company's
interest is entitled to some weight or at least that that is a question of
fact.
5. The Means Employed
In some jurisdictions, a coworker may be a third party if the method
of interfering constituted a tort in its own right. 161 "A supervisor is
considered to have acted outside the scope of his employment if there is
evidence that the supervisor's manner of interference involved
independent tortious acts such as fraud or misrepresentations."1 6 2 Of
156. See Huff 606 N.W.2d at 470.
157. Id.
158. Wilson v. St. Luke's Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-00122-BLW, 2014 WL 7186811,
at *31 (D. Idaho Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting Wooley Tr. v. DeBest Plumbing, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (Idaho
1999)).
159. Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tenn. 1994) (emphasis added).
160. Burton v. Cmty. & Econ. Dev. Ass'n of Cook Cty., Inc., No. 15-C-4556, 2016 WL
3027901, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2016) ("If Burton was a good employee, then an effort to
discipline or fire her was contrary to the best interests of the corporation. It follows that if
Thompson engaged in such conduct, she was not furthering the best interests of her employer.").
161. See, e.g., Cohen v. Davis, 926 F. Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
162. Id. The court indicated that malice or ill will could alternatively satisfy the third-party
requirement. Id.
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course, in that event, the employee presumably could sue the supervisor
for the underlying tort (e.g., defamation), so the interference claim is
unnecessary.
6. Motive, Malice, and Ill Will
"The question of the supervisor's motive can be pivotal to whether
the supervisor is a third party to the contract." 1 63 Unfortunately, the
inquiry into the defendant's motive for purposes of determining his
third-party status is easily confused with the separate question whether
the interference was "improper," which may include both improper
methods and improper motives.1 64 Some courts also seem to use motive
and interests interchangeably. 165
Under motive analysis, malice is often the main consideration. 166
In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff must prove "legal malice" to prevail on
an employment interference claim. 167 Circling back to an agency
approach, some decisions suggest that as long as the coworker's actions
were "taken in connection with the exercise of their duties," they did not
act with legal malice.168 In other words, if a coworker acts within the
scope of his duties to the employer, he did not have the requisite malice
and cannot be a third party. 169 That is not really a motive inquiry, but
rather a scope-of-employment one.
Malice may mean more than hostility toward or dislike of an
163. See Porter v. Oba., Inc., 42 P.3d 931, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (Edmonds, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
164. In Massachusetts, actual malice is "a proxy for proof that a supervisor was not acting on
the employer's behalf . . ." Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.
2001). As noted, the elements of a discrimination claim may be used to demonstrate malice in the
context of a tortious interference claim; in other words, discrimination is among those "[clertain

situations [that] lend themselves to proof of malice." Id. at 77. Nonetheless, malice must have been
the controlling factor in the supervisor's conduct, requires more than a showing of hostility, must be

based on probabilities rather than possibilities, and requires "an affirmative showing that the actions
taken by the supervisor were not derived from a desire to advance" the company's "legitimate
interests." Id.
165. E.g., Vazirani v. Heitz, 741 F.3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2013) (adopting test used by the
district court that defendants were third parties only if their actions "were so contrary to [the

company's] interests that they could only have been motivated by personal interests").
166. See Varner v. Bryan, 440 S.E.2d 295, 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
167. Id. ("It is not enough, however, to show that a defendant acted with actual malice; the
plaintiff must forecast evidence that the defendant acted with legal malice. A person acts with legal
malice if he does a wrongful act or exceeds his legal right or authority in order to prevent the
continuation of the contract between the parties.").
168. Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw, No. 14 CVS 1701, 2015 WL 1441826, at *15 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2015).
169. See id.
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employee. "The fact that an employer may have breathed a sigh of relief
when showing the door to a gadfly or a nettlesome employee does not
transform a founded dismissal into a malicious act." 170 Recognizing that
in intentional interference claims "frequently 'some element of ill will"'
is involved, one court stated that if a coworker is "generally acting in
furtherance of the corporate interest, 'the addition of a spite motive
usually is not regarded as sufficient to result in liability." 17 1 Another
court summarized:
The Court does not doubt that in many cases, a fired
employee could allege and produce evidence that a
supervisor made the decision for personal motivesallowed. . . "personal feelings of pride, jealousy, anger,
revenge and malice to color" the supervisor's attitude
toward the employee. If such allegations of personal
motives were enough to give the employee a cause of
action . . the landscape of Indiana employment law
would shift dramatically. 17 2
The Vermont Supreme Court has indicated that the legal malice
standard is more demanding in employment interference cases. 173 The
court upheld dismissal of a claim for lack of malice, noting:
Certainly, one may conclude that these defendants acted
improperly, which would be sufficient under a
traditional tortious interference claim involving a
distinct third person. But here we are dealing with an
exception to the rule that a third party cannot interfere
with itself, which, if allowable at all, requires a higher
showing of malice. 174
170. Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2007).
171. Thompson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 416 S.W.3d 402, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011)
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

130, 1009-10 (5th ed.

1984)).
172. Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (S.D. Ind. 1995); see also
Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs, 845 N.E.2d 130, 140 (Ind. 2006) (holding that if supervisor's authority
included the right to terminate plaintiff, the termination was within the scope of his duties, and his
motives could not affect that conclusion).

173. Skaskiw v. Vt. Agency of Agric., 112 A.3d 1277, 1289 (Vt. 2014).
174. Id. It is not clear how the court intended this standard to differ from the other standards
discussed in this section of the Article. The court continued:
Skaskiw did not allege that defendants were acting with actual malice or that
they were acting outside of the scope of their employment, that is, acting for
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In other jurisdictions, it is irrelevant whether the coworker acted
with malice or for some other improper purpose: malice may make a bad
case worse, but it does not make wrong that which is lawful.17 1 Other
decisions similarly hold that a coworker's motive is not material to the
third-party element where the coworker acted within the scope of his
employment. 176
7. Unfaithful or Unlawful Conduct
The fact that a coworker was unfaithful in executing his duties does
not necessarily mean he acted as a third party. In addressing claims by
an employee that a coworker's actions were unfaithful to the company's
interests, courts typically turn to the scope of employment analysis.177
For example, where the defendant's duties included providing
information about the company's executive director to the company's
board, the fact that the defendant provided false information did not
make him a third party.' 7 8 According to the court, neither the fact that
he was untruthful, nor his reasons for lying affect whether his actions
fell within the scope of his duties.1 79
What if the defendant's actions toward the employee were illegal?
Court decisions cut both ways, and the determining factor may be
whether the focus is on the scope of employment or on motive.s 0 Some
courts have explained that the fact that a coworker's actions were illegal
does not mean he acted outside the scope of his employment or for
their own benefit rather than the benefit of DCF. Skaskiw's allegations
suggest that defendants did not want her to continue [employment], but she
makes no allegation that defendants were motivated by personal spite or ill
will.
Id.
175. 15 RULING CASE LAW 70 (William M. McKinney et al. eds., Edward Thompson Co. et al.
1929) (1917) ("It is unquestionably a general rule in the law of torts applicable in many cases
involving interference with a trade or calling that, while malicious motives may make a bad case
worse, the bad motive which inspires an act will not change its complexion, and render it unlawful,
if otherwise the act was done in the exercise of an undoubted right."). That question is also
particularly relevant to whether the coworker acted "improperly," discussed below.
176. Jones v. Wheelersburg Local Sch. Dist., 2013 WL4647645, No. 12CA3513, at *29 (Ohio
App. 2013); Anderson v. Minter, 291 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ohio 1972); see also Rose v. Zurowski, 511
S.E.2d 265, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("Bad- motive, a subjective prompter, does not poison the
legitimacy of an act, which is measured objectively.").
177. Porter v. Oba., Inc., 42 P.3d 931, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 937.
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personal interests. s8 Coworkers certainly may act as agents of the
company when they violate laws or policies in taking employment
action.182 For example, an officer carrying out a scheme to defraud the
government, however inexcusable that conduct, is not a third party if
that is the corporation's objective. Therefore, if he fires an employee for
objecting to the illegal scheme, he is acting as the company's agent, not
meddling. As a federal court explained:
Under [plaintiffs theory], whenever an employee acts
with an unlawful purpose, then they are automatically
considered a third party-never mind that the employee
was acting within the scope of his employment, or even
acting with a purpose shared and encouraged by his
employer. In such cases, the scope of employment
inquiry would be entirely unnecessary. That, in turn,
would be inconsistent with the purpose of this- entire
analysis-to determine if the coemployee was acting as
a third person, i.e., one not aligned with the interests of
the employer. And that analysis goes to the very thing
that this tort was meant to protect against: interference
from "outside intermeddlers."l 8 3
The court found, "While [plaintiff] has alleged that [defendant] acted
with an unlawful purpose, it was apparently a purpose" the defendant
shared with the company.1 84 He was not a third party.185
Other courts assume that if a supervisor acted with a motive that
was unlawful, such as age discrimination, he is liable for tortious
interference.1 8 6 These courts reason that the supervisor could not have
181. Verby v. Paypal, Inc., No. 8:13-CV-51, 2014 WL 1689684, at *17 (D. Neb. Apr. 29,
2014) ("Even if [defendants'] actions had been taken in contravention of Title VII or the FMLA,
that would not establish that they had a personal interest in the plaintiffs termination.").
182. Gorney v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 43 F. Supp. 3d 946, 956 (D. Ariz. 2014).
183. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801, at *23
(D. Neb Dec. 10, 2014) (quoting Gruhlke v. Sioux Empire Fed. Credit Union, Inc., 756 N.W.2d
399, 404 (S.D. 2008)).
184. Id. at *25.
185. Id.
186. Morris v. Young, No. 1:14-CV-136-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 2354642, at *4 (N.D. Miss. May
3, 2016) (permitting claim to proceed against supervisor where the gist of the claim was that the
supervisor caused plaintiffs termination because of her age, not in order to further his or the
employer's economic interests); Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 121 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136
(D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 262 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The bottom line is that the jury concluded that
Breslin engaged in unlawful conduct. Such actions quite simply cannot be viewed as falling either
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been acting for the company's interests or within the scope of his
employment if his conduct was unlawful.' 8 In other jurisdictions, the
violation of an anti-discrimination statute is not a tort under state law, so
if the jurisdiction requires a showing that a coworker's interference was
independently tortious, statutory violations will not suffice. 188 If
Mindy's status as a third-party depends on whether she was engaged in
duties on behalf of TD & Co., she likely would obtain an early dismissal
of Ryan's case. If third-party status depends on Mindy's motive, she
likely will not. 189
D. Tolerable Meddling Versus "Improper"Interference
It is a given that an employment interference claim requires
intent. 190 Under the Restatement, intent means that the defendant acted
"for the primary purpose of interfering with the performance of the
contract," and also if he desired to interfere, even though he may have
had an additional purpose. 191 Even if he lacks a purpose or desire to
interfere, he may have the requisite intent if he knows "that the
interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his
action."l 92 In other words, the intent element is satisfied by "an

within the legitimate scope of a corporate officer's employment or within the corporation's
legitimate interests. At least on the facts of this case, to conclude otherwise would be to cloak a
wayward supervisor with impunity for his unlawful acts."). As the First Circuit stated in affirming,
"Massachusetts is far more plaintiff-friendly than other jurisdictions" because it establishes liability
upon a showing of actual malice. Id. at 76 n.5.
187. Zimmerman, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
188. Baguer v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 04-CV-8393, 2007 WL 2780390, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (stating that "violations of federal, state, and city anti-discrimination laws
are not torts under New York law").

189. See Rando v. Leonard, 826 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2016). Some jurisdictions indicate that
heightened proof requirements are imposed concerning the third party element if the defendant is a
coworker, at least as to coworkers higher in the company hierarchy. Id. ("In assessing whether a
defendant acted with improper motive or means, Massachusetts courts apply a heightened standard
where defendants are 'corporate officials' acting 'within the scope of their employment
responsibilities."').
190.

RESTATEMENT

§

766C cmt. a ("Liability for interference with contracts and prospective

contractual relations developed in the field of intentional torts.. . . [T]here has been no general
recognition of any liability for a negligent interference."); see id. §§ 8A, II (intent means a desire to
cause the consequences or a belief that the consequences are substantially certain). Whether the
coworker must have intended to interfere, or must have intended the end result of the interference

(e.g., termination) is not clear. See, e.g., Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1971)
("It must be emphasized that the tort we are considering is an intentional one: the actor is acting as

he does for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff.").
191.

RESTATEMENT

§ 766

cmt.j.

192. Id.
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interference that is incidental to the actor's independent purpose and
desire but known to him to be a necessary consequence of his action."
However, intent is not sufficient. 194 Obviously, every decision to
fire an employee is "intended" to break the employment relationship. In
a strong sense, supervisors and managers are expected to interfere with
their subordinates' careers. No employee can take a job expecting that
the boss will not influence his career trajectory, for better or for worse.
1 95
The coworker's conduct must also have been "improper."
The question whether conduct was improper has spawned legions
of court opinions.196

Section 767 of the Restatement directs us to that

197
As
familiar step in assessing tort claims: The balancing-of-interests.
consider:
to
are
courts
context,
employment
the
to
adapted

(a) the nature of the coworker's conduct;
(b) the coworker's motive;
(c) the interests of the employee with which the
coworker's conduct interferes;
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the coworker;
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of
action of the coworker and the contractual interests of
the employee;
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the coworker's
conduct to the interference; and
198
(g) the relations between the parties.

193. Id.
194. "We find nothing inherently wrongful in 'interference' itself." Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (Ariz. 1985); Matrai v. AM Entm't, LLC, No. 14-2022-SAC,
2015 WIL 1646214, at *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2015) ("[T]he complaint's allegation that Miller acted
"intentionally" is a conclusion. It neither alleges that Miller acted with specific intent to injure
Plaintiffs nor alleges facts otherwise sufficient to show malice. A party whose acts are motivated by
his own self-interest does not necessarily act maliciously. Therefore, merely alleging that Miller
intentionally dissuaded the contracting party from going forward with the Plaintiffs' business
relationship is insufficient to allege malice.") (citations omitted).
195. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1043; Matrai, 2015 WL 1646214, at *2.
196.

Some courts approach the "improper" element from another direction, asking whether the

defendant's conduct was privileged or justified. See Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 441 Pa. 474, 482
(1971). However, the Restatement no longer follows that approach. RESTATEMENT § 767 cmt. b.
(The law of tortious interference "has not developed a crystallized set of definite rules as to the
existence or non-existence of a privilege to act. . . . Because of this fact, this [s]ection is expressed
in terms of whether the interference is improper or not, rather than in terms of whether there was a

specific privilege to act in the manner specified.").
197. See RESTATEMENT § 767 cmt. b.
198. Matrai, 2015 WL 1646214, at *7-8.
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Thus, courts are to determine whether an action is improper by
considering the "nature" of the bad act, the defendant's motive,
everyone's interests (including society's), the connection between the
conduct and the interference, and the parties' relationship.' 99 This omits
only the kitchen sink. As one authority stated more gauzily, the question
is whether the conduct was "sanctioned by the rules of the game which
society has adopted" and falls within "the area of socially acceptable
conduct which the law regards as privileged."2 00 If Mindy's evaluation
of Ryan was not "socially acceptable" or violated one of the unwritten
"rules of the game," she apparently may be a tortfeasor.201
As an initial matter, these factors can be applied in an outcomedeterminative way.202 Under factor (g), for example, a court might
reason that if the "relation[] between the parties" is their working
relationship, no claim is available because the premise of at-will
employment is that courts will not intervene to second-guess a
discharge. 2 03 Also, the tenuous nature of an at-will "relation[]" suggests
the plaintiff deserved little or no protection, and under factor (e) the
"contractual interests" of the plaintiff are negligible. 20 Another court
might conversely conclude that factor (g) favors the plaintiff in an
employment interference case: jobs are essential to one's livelihood (see
factor (c)), and coworkers should not lightly interfere with them.
Additionally, it is apparent that the factors to be considered in
whether the interference was improper considerably overlap with those
determinative of third-party status, discussed above. For example, the
defendant's motive is relevant both to whether he is a third party and
whether his conduct was improper.20 5
1.

Unlawful Conduct

Improper and unlawful conduct may be two sides of the same coin.
In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff only has a potential claim if he can

199. Id.
200. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Askinazi, No. CIV.A.99-5581, 2000 WL 964753, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. July 12, 2000).
201. "[T]he determination of whether the interference was improper or not is ordinarily left to
the jury, to obtain its common feel for the state of community mores and for the manner in which
they would operate upon the facts in question." RESTATEMENT

202.

See Matrai,2015 WL 1646214, at *7-8.

203.

See RESTATEMENT

§ 767

cmt. 1.

§ 767.

204. See id.
205. See id. § 767 cmt. d.
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20 6
The method of interference
show that the interference was unlawful.
2 07
must be independently tortious or illegal (further discussed below).
2 08
Improper conduct not otherwise unlawful is not actionable.
Approaching the postulated symmetry in reverse, if the defendant's
conduct was unlawful it may for that reason be improper. According to
the Restatement, "[c]onduct specifically in violation of statutory
provisions or contrary to established public policy may for that reason
make an interference improper. . . [such as] conduct that is in violation
of statutes, regulations, or judicial or administrative holdings regarding
labor relations."20 9
Any number of court decisions conclude that if the defendant's
21
conduct was unlawful, it was improper.21 If the defendant's refusal to
pay wages violated a state wage payment law, that conduct was also
2 11
improper for purposes of an interference claim.212 Discrimination or
Some jurisdictions
retaliation by a superior may also be improper.
the defendant's
that
proving
by
element
this
satisfy
to
plaintiff
the
allow
wrongful or
inherently
is
that
act
an
se"-i.e.,
action was "wrongful per
2 13
that can never be justified under any circumstances."

2. Motive, Malice and Personal Gain
Section 767 factor (b) indicates the defendant's motive is
2 15
The
relevant.2 14 However, a contrary trend may be developing.
motive factor has been criticized for failing to provide adequate
standards "to guide juries' improper-purpose findings or to inform
2 16 The trend shifts
private parties of their legal rights and obligations."
206. Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2016).
207. Id. (applying Indiana law: "illegal conduct is an essential element in a claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship"); Rutland v. Mullen, 798 A.2d 1104, 1110 (Me. 2002)
(fraud or intimidation is an element of tortious interference claim; non-employment case).
208. See Pierce, 818 F.3d at 278.
209.

RESTATEMENT

§ 767

cmt. c.

210. See, e.g., Stafford v. Puro, 63 F.3d 1436, 1442 (7th Cir. 1995); LeGoff v. Trs. of Bos.
Univ., 23 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130 (D. Mass. 1998).
211. Stafford, 63 F.3dat 1442.
212. LeGoff, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 130 ("[lIn alleging that Haines and Strickler discriminated
against her on the basis of gender, and threatened and retaliated against her for complaining of that
discrimination, LeGoff has made out aprimafaciecase of tortious interference.").
213. Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
214. See RESTATEMENT

§ 767.

215. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 639 560 (2d ed. 2011) (observing "a definite
movement toward limiting or even eliminating motive-based liability").
216. Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553, 555 (Utah 2015) (In distinguishing Leigh Furniture
& Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the court in Eldridge observed: "Anger and even
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the focus to whether the means of interference were improper, and, more
specifically, whether the defendant's conduct was independently tortious
or unlawful.2 17 The Restatement suggests a sliding scale: The more
improper the conduct, such as if the conduct is independently unlawful
or tortious, the less significant motive becomes. 218
Some courts reason that an act is improper if it is unjustified and
that malice in the form of "bad motive" is not determinative.2 19
A key component in the analysis of a tortious
interference claim under the Restatement involves an
understanding of the term "improper" and how it differs
from "malice" . . . actual malice, i.e., ill will toward the
plaintiff, is not required. ... Rather, actions are

improper if they are not justified. An action may be
justified if, for example, it was undertaken to protect the
public interest.220
Nonetheless, courts equate "bad motive" and "improper" all the
time, 21 and the focus on ill motive requires difficult line-drawing. On
the one hand, personal dislike and favoritism would not normally be
considered improper,222 although evidence that the defendant personally
disliked the plaintiff would likely minimize the likelihood that the
defendant would obtain summary judgment and color jury perceptions of
the dispute, should one arise. The defendant's pursuit of financial gain
likewise is not likely improper conduct. 223 "Without more, mere
presentation of proof that [the defendant] may have been motivated by
'personal gain, including financial gain' is insufficient to show
malice are commonplace human emotions, and it would be neither possible nor desirable to treat
every angry or malicious action as a tort.

Even a tort allowing liability whenever a defendant

maliciously interfered with a plaintiffs economic relations would be unwise." Id. at 561 (neither
Eldridge nor Leigh Furniturewere employment interference cases).
217. See Eldridge, 345 P.3d at 564; see also Williams v. Cobb Cty. Farm Bureau, Inc., 718
S.E.2d 540, 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (holding coworker's actions must be malicious and unlawful).
218. See RESTATEMENT § 767 cmt. d.
219. Skaskiw v. Vt. Agency of Agric., 112 A.3d 1277, 1288 (Vt. 2014).
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. See, e.g., OfficeMax Inc. v. Sousa, 773 F. Supp. 2d 190, 241 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that a
"bad motive" is not enough by itself to prove that the occurrence of an improper act in litigation).
222. Maniates v. Lake Cty. Or., No. CV 08-3038-PA, 2009 WL 395159, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 12,
2009), as corrected (Feb. 17, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Maniates v. Lake Cty. Or., 370 App'x 853 (9th
Cir. 2010) ("Imposing personal liability upon a manager merely for hiring a candidate who the
manager likes could leave persons who make hiring decisions liable to every disappointed job
applicant-and there can be dozens or even hundreds of applicants for a job opening.").
223. Portnoy v. 440 Fin. Grp. of Worcester, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 91, 94-95 (D. Mass. 1996).
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intentional interference." 22 4 If Mindy disliked Ryan, or if she viewed
Ryan as a threat to her own standing and job security at TD & Co., and
for that reason decided to knock Ryan down a peg, her motive might not
be improper under this standard.
25
On the other hand, personal vindictiveness may be improper.
Where, for example, an employee alleged that a coworker retaliated
against her because she had reported alleged misconduct that harmed the
coworker's reputation, that allegation stated an employment interference
226
claim. "Vindictiveness is, by its nature, malicious."
As is the case regarding the third-party element, the inquiry into
whether the defendant's conduct was improper becomes more difficult if
the conduct was partially for the employer's benefit but partially
personal.227 "[W]here, as in most cases, the defendant acts at least in
part for the purpose of protecting some legitimate interest which
conflicts with that of the plaintiff, a line must be drawn and the interests
evaluated." 22 8
3.

The Means Employed

The means of the alleged interference is important in determining if
the conduct was improper. 22 9 Often, courts allow the plaintiff to show
23 0
As noted, in New York,
either improper motive or improper means.
23
Only if
determinative.231
not
is
termination
the propriety (or not) of the
is an
termination
the coworker used "wrongful means to effect" the
232
The focus is not on what the
employment interference claim viable.
defendant was doing, what he was thinking, or whose interests he was
serving, but rather whether the plaintiff has an independent viable claim
against hi 233
224. Id.
225. See Duty v. Boys & Girls Club of Porter Cty., 23 N.E.3d 768, 775 (id. Ct. App. 2014).
226. Id.
227. See Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1971).
228. Id.
229. Doron v. E. Wash. Univ., No. 31636-o-III, at *35 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
230. Id. ("Plaintiff must show not only that the defendant intentionally interfered with his
business relationship, but also that the defendant had a duty of noninterference; i.e., that he
interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means.") (citing Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112
Wash. 2d 794, 804 (Wash. 1989)).
231. See McHenry v. Lawrence, 66 A.D.3d 650, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 651-52 (The plaintiff's independent viable claim is satisfied by demonstrating
that a business relationship existed between the parties, and that the relationship was terminated due
to the defendant's interference). Specifically,
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Courts that reject premising interference liability on motive, as
discussed above, require proof of "wrongful" conduct.2 34 Adopting that
standard nonetheless requires a court to define what wrongful means.2 35
The Texas Supreme Court held:
[T]o recover for tortious interference with a prospective
business relation a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct was independently tortious or
wrongful. By independently tortious we do not mean
that the plaintiff must be able to prove an independent
tort. Rather, we mean only that the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's conduct would be actionable under
a recognized tort. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may
recover for tortious interference from a defendant who
makes fraudulent statements about the plaintiff to a third
person without proving that the third person was
actually defrauded.
If, on the other hand, the
defendant's statements are not intended to deceive . .
they are not actionable.236
A relatively common argument is that a coworker caused the
plaintiffs discharge by defamation.237
Because defamation is a
recognized tort, a false statement may be wrongful conduct, as the Texas
case indicates. 2 3 8 In some jurisdictions, however, defamation is not
sufficient to satisfy the improper means requirement.239 In other
jurisdictions, courts have required the plaintiff to be specific as to the
defamatory statements. 240 In addition, where defamation is the asserted

the plaintiff is required to show: "(1) the existence of a business relationship
between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendants' interference with
that business relationship; (3) that the defendants acted with the sole purpose
of harming plaintiff . .. ; and (4) that such acts resulted in the injury to the
plaintiffs relationship with the third party."
Id. (citations omitted). Proving a defendant's intention alone, such as acting with malice, is
insufficient to create an independent viable claim. Id. at 652.
234. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001).
235. Seeid.at715.
236. Id. at 726.
237. See id. at 716 ("For centuries the common law continued to allow civil actions for
interference with ... other prospective business relationships, . . . in all of them the actor's conduct
.

characterized by . .. defamation. .

238.
239.
240.

Id. at 716, 726.
Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 223.
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improper conduct, defendants who sue for employment interference
claims may be entitled to the same qualified privilege that limits
defamation claims.2 4 1 If that is all true, then why not limit the plaintiff
to a defamation claim?
Accepting an allegation of defamation to satisfy the wrongful
means requirement would potentially open the door to a vast number of
employment interference claims. Any former employee unhappy with
his discharge could easily contend that any and all criticism of his
performance was "a lie"-and, moreover, that the truth or falsity of the
criticisms presents an issue of fact requiring a trial.

Multiple factors reveal that employment interference claims against
coworkers rest on a fatally fractured foundation: (1) significant
24 2
especially
inconsistencies in judicial application of the claim,
language
imprecise
(2)
party;
a
third
as
status
regarding the defendant's
the fact
by
in court decisions about the claim's elements, confounded
that several inquiries (e.g., motive) apply to different elements; (3) the
extraordinarily generic definition offered by the Restatement, which
concedes that the claim has never really crystallized; (4) frequent
attempts by courts to clarify the claim by changing the requirements
(e.g., requiring improper means); and (5) a lack of clarity of the duties
and expectations the tort theory imposes on coworkers, particularly on
supervisors and managers who must make sometimes difficult
employment decisions.
The reader may be the judge of the viability of Ryan's employment
interference claim. Is litigation required to determine if Mindy was
motivated by spite or ill will? If she did in fact check Ryan's progress
because she feared his potential, is that an "improper" motive, and does
2 43
Should
it remove her from her standing as an agent of TD & Co.?
241. See Calor v. Ashland Hosp. Corp., Nos. 2007-SC-000573-DG, 2008-SC-000317-DG,
2011 WL 4431143, at *12 (Ky. Sept. 22, 2011); Long, The Disconnect, supra note 1, at 539-40
(suggesting that if a supervisor allegedly caused the plaintiffs termination "through the use of
slanderous allegations," the plaintiff should "be able to reach a jury" on an employment interference
claim).
242. See Long, The Disconnect, supra note 1, at 493 (explaining that one of the factors that
contributes to the fatally fractured foundation and weakening of employment interference claims, is
the "judicial treatment of interference claims in employment at-will settings").
243. See id. at 492.
[R]un-of-the-mill 'dislike' is hardly a strong basis upon which to bring a legal
claim against anyone. However, if the 'dislike' can be characterized as
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Ryan be permitted to maintain a claim that the evaluations were unfair if
he would not be able to plead a viable claim that they were defamatory?
And, if Ryan's claim is allowed to advance, what effect would that have
on supervisors and managers in that jurisdiction, who might now fear
personal liability? Despite many unanswered questions and despite the
lack of reasoned consideration for applying tortious interference theory
to coworker disputes in the first place, the tort of employment
interference survives.
III.

IN MEMORIAM

About fifteen years ago, a flurry of legal commentary focused on
the problems with employment interference claims.244
Some
emphasized the conflict between these claims and the at-will doctrine
and the restraints on public policy claims.245 Some focused on the
difficulties courts encountered in attempting to apply the elements of the
claim.246
Solutions, however, have not evolved. 2 47
In fact, the
considerable defects in employment interference claims are not
curable.24 8 Courts should no longer recognize claims for tortious
interference between coworkers arising from workplace disputes.
'personal hostility,' 'ill will,' or some other reasonable synonym, and the atwill employee can show that such feelings were the sole motivation ... [the
employment action] 'is almost certain to be held' unlawful.
Id. (citations omitted).
244. See, e.g., id.; Rebecca Bernhard, Note, The Three Faces of Eve: Tortious Interference
Claims in the Employment-at-Will Setting, 86 MiNN. L. REv. 1541, 1572 (2002); Cavico, supra note
70, at 569; Long, Tortious Interference, supra note 49, at 913-14; Amy Timmer, Interference with
Prospective Contractual Relations: A Tort Only a Mind Reader Could Plead in the Michigan
Courts, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 1443, 1474 (1999).
245. See Bernhard, supra note 244, at 1572 (discussing protection for at-will employees from
abuse of employers by a correlation to other accepted claims that offend public policy, but noting
the importance of balancing the interests of both employers and employees through judicial
clarification of "when and why a tortious interference claim can proceed").
246. See, e.g., Timmer, supra note 244, at 1474 (noting that although the court mentions the
Restatement section for tortious interference, it never adopted the test).
247. See Bernhard, supra note 244, at 1573 (proposing that courts emphasize agency principles
in determining employment interference liability); Cavico, supra note 70, at 569 (calling on
judiciary to provide "the definitive answers, requirements, and standards, and order itself' because
otherwise tortious interference in the employment context "will be an increasingly confounding and
exceedingly challenging area of the law"); Long, Tortious Interference, supra note 49, at 914
("Until some order is established in the judiciary's resolution of such claims, the interference torts
will continue to be a difficult meal to digest."); Timmer, supra note 244, at 1477 (stating that "[t]he
madness has to stop," referring to the Michigan Court of Appeals' failure to adopt the most essential
section necessary to properly apply the tort of interference).
248. See, e.g., Timmer, supra note 244, at 1477 (explaining that if the court fails to clarify the
inconsistent law, legitimate cases will continue to be improperly dismissed).
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As a starting point, pedigree does not justify the perpetuation of a
cause of action whose utility time has brought into question.249 [M]any
tort theories have not withstood the tests of time." 250 In any event, what
this Article proposes is not so much the cold-blooded murder of a
celebrated tort but an earnest inquiry whether internal workplace
contests should be subject to the claim in the first place. Courts have not
seriously pondered that question. As employment protections have
modernized, courts have not meaningfully considered whether
employment interference theory comfortably and appropriately coexists
with contemporary employment law. They should do so--and should
decline to recognize employment interference claims.
A. Common-law Recognition of a Tort Theory Does Not Justify its
Mechanical or IndiscreetApplication in All Circumstances
Perhaps further justification for the notion that torts may be
abandoned is in order. That a tort theory evolved does not require that it
apply in all contexts and to all relationships. Entire categories of
relationships may be exempted from tortious interference claims, as
marital relations have been. 2 51 The workplace is likewise a setting
where courts sometimes deem an otherwise viable tort theory
inappropriate.2 52 For example, some courts have abolished negligencebased interference 25 and emotional distress claims in the employment
context. 254

249. See Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Wis. 1978) (A
"historical pedigree, albeit old and long ... is insufficient authority on which to base a decision
affirming [a common-law claim's] continued viability in the context of modem employment
relations. The critical question is not whether the cause of action for which plaintiff argues once
existed, but rather whether present circumstances and progressive social policy recommend its
continued existence.").

250. Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 359, 377 (2008); Horton v. Or.
Health & Sci. Univ., 376 P.3d 998, 1063 n.19 (Or. 2016) (Landau, J., concurring) ("Quite a number
of torts have fallen by the wayside over the last century.").
251. See, e.g., Horton, 376 P.3d at 1007; Graham, supra note 250, at 428.
252. See Timmer, supra note 244, at 1477.
253. See, e.g., Hartridge,271 N.W.2d at 601. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
The historic common-law right of a master to recover for loss of services due
to a servant's injury by a negligent third party contemplated a quasi-familial
relationship which does not exist between a modem-day employer and his
employee. The action, however valid in feudal societies, is out of place in
modem times.

It is a carry-over from an earlier day, ill-adapted to current

social and economic realities.
Id.
254. See Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 769 (Conn. 2002) ("[E]mployees who
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In some instances, courts have modified tort theories to take the
employment context into account.2 55 Defamation claims have the
potential to impinge upon legitimate employer interests, which justifies
stricter scrutiny of workplace defamation claims. 2 56 Courts have only
grudgingly considered intentional emotional distress claims arising in
the employment context. 257 Even as courts recognize public policy
claims, they remain mindful that distinctive interests are at stake in
employment relationships and have attempted to confine the reach of
those claims accordingly.258 To an extent, courts sometimes also elevate
the proof requirements associated with tortious interference claims,259
which is effectively a step in eliminating the cause of action. For
example, in Michigan, where malice is alleged, the "plaintiff [] must
demonstrate, with specificity, affirmative acts ... which corroborate the
unlawful purpose of the interference." 26 0
Legislatures also remove tort theories from the workplace via prefear lawsuits by fellow employees may be less competitive with each other, may promote the
interests of their employer less vigorously, may refrain from reporting the improper or even illegal
conduct of fellow employees, may be less frank in performance evaluations, and may make
employment decisions such as demotions, promotions and transfers on the basis of fear of suit rather
than business needs and desires. All of this conduct would contribute to a less vigorous and less
productive workplace. We conclude that such a pervasive chilling effect outweighs the safety
interest of employees in being protected from negligent infliction of emotional distress.").
255. See Sheppard v. Freeman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). As to commonlaw claims, "it is proper and appropriate for the court to limit them in the employment context." Id.
at nl.
256. See Murphy v. City of Kirkland, No. 61966-7-1, 2009 WL 8558827 at *4 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009) ("[W]e note that courts in other jurisdictions have expressed great reluctance to allow judicial
interference, specifically defamation claims, in the arena of performance evaluations. Given the
importance of such evaluations in the workplace, their inherently subjective nature, and the need for
candor in their execution, we agree that courts should exercise caution in this area.").
257. "Mindful of New York's strong employment-at-will doctrine and the protections provided
by ... statutes, however, courts have been particularly wary of claims for [emotional distress] in the
[workplace] context, and have held plaintiffs to a very high standard for pleading outrageousness."
Steven Aptheker & Russell Penzer, Rethinking Tort Claims in Employment Discrimination Cases,
248 N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 18, 2012); see also Futrell v. Dep't of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793,
808 (D.C. 2003) ("[w]e have been exacting as to the proof required to sustain [emotional distress]
claims 'in an employment context"'); Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress
and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.

U. L. REv. 387, 412 (1994) ("[T]he expansive application of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in earlier cases has given way to the recent trend toward limiting the tort, either by using
preemptive theories, such as workers' compensation, or by narrowing its application in employment
cases.").
258. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387-88 (Conn. 1980) ("We
are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion
or to foment unwarranted litigation.").
259. See Feldman v. Green, 360 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
260. Id. at 886.
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emptive laws.2 61 The Texas statute protecting workers against
discrimination, for example, is the exclusive remedy for alleged
wrongdoing that falls within the scope of the law, even if the
wrongdoing might support common-law claims. 2 62 "[A]llowing [a
plaintiff] to recover on her tort claim would collide with [an] elaborately
crafted statutory scheme [] that .. . incorporates a legislative attempt to
balance various interests and concerns of employees and employers."26 3
Displacing interference claims in favor of workplace-tailored ones
The Uniform Commissioners' Model
is not a novel proposal.
Employment Termination Act proposed a wrongful termination cause of
action that would "extinguish[] all common-law rights and claims of a
terminated employee against the employer, its officers, directors, and
employees, which are based on the termination or on acts taken or
statements made that are reasonably necessary to initiate or effect the
termination." 2 64 There are already calls to eliminate or at least limit
public policy tort claims, even though they are designed for workplace
disputes. 265 Arguably, while perhaps once useful to serve a purpose,
other causes of action provide adequate protection and the public policy
claim in "its current application threatens to engulf the at-will
employment rule." 266
In addition, some states do not permit an employee to bring a public
policy claim for discharge or discipline if a statute provides a cause of
action and a remedy adequate to vindicate that public policy. 26 7 For
261. See Woods v. Cmtys. in Sch. Se. Tex., No. 09-14-00021-CV, 2015 WL 2414260, at *8
(Tex. App. May 21, 2015).
262. Id. ("If the complained-of acts constitute a statutory violation ... those acts cannot also
serve as the basis of an independent common-law claim.").
263. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804, 816 (Tex. 2010) (The Court
disallowed the plaintiffs negligence claim against her employer arising out of an assault by a
coworker.

The statute thus eliminates this class of employment interference claims premised on

unlawful discrimination.); see also Pruitt v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 366 S.W.3d 740, 748-50
(Tex. App. 2012) (holding that the statutory remedy for discrimination preempted the claim against
the union for alleged tortious interference with plaintiffs municipal employment because "the
gravamen of his complaint is racial discrimination and [] his common-law causes of action are
based on the same course of conduct giving rise to his statutory discrimination claim"); Woods,
2015 WL 2414260, at *7, *10 (dismissing the claim against employer's executive director, arising
from plaintiffs employment termination, because the suit against coworker was an effort to sidestep
preemptive statutory cause of action).
264. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISIONERS' MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT§ 2(c) (1991) (emphasis added).

265.
266.

See Swift, supra note 22, at 581.
Id. at 584. But cf id. at 581 (on the other hand, it is suggested that it is the at-will doctrine

that should be put to rest).

267. See, e.g., Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. 2014) ("As
numerous courts have recognized, adoption of a new cause of action is particularly inappropriate
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example, the Oregon Supreme Court declined to recognize a public
policy claim arising from alleged retaliation against a worker for
reporting workplace safety concerns.268 The court reasoned that
"existing remedies are adequate to protect both the interests of society in
maintaining safe working conditions and the interests of employees who
are discharged for complaining about safety and health problems." 269
That reasoning applies here: At a minimum, courts should not recognize
employment interference claims where another cause of action exists.
B. Tortious Interference Claims Improperly Elevate the Duties of
Coworkers Over those of the Employer
The tort of interference imposes on everyone a general duty not to
"intentionally and improperly interfere[] with another's" cognizable
relationships to their harm.270 Those generalities, of course, do not
usefully mark out Mindy's legal obligations to Ryan. Supervisors have
no legal duty to be even-handed, accurate, or altruistic in writing
performance appraisals. While one might presume, then, that any duties
owed Ryan are owed primarily by TD & Co., employment interference
theory shifts those duties to Mindy.
Rudimentary legal logic ordains that if an employee has no
protected expectation of his employer about his employment, he likewise
lacks that expectation vis-d-vis coworkers. 2 71 If that is true, tortious

.

when the Legislature has already provided other remedies to vindicate the public policy of the
state."); Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ohio 2002) (declining to allow a public
policy claim, because doing so would be "unnecessary to vindicate the policy goals" of the Family
and Medical Leave Act).
268. Walsh v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 563 P.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Or. 1977).
269. Id. at 1208; see also McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 34 P.3d 1262, 1272 (Wyo. 2001)
("[T]here is no claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Wyoming law. .
where an administrative remedy exists."); Lumry v. State, 307 P.3d 232, 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013)
("[F]or this court to find that a claim for retaliatory discharge for violation of the FLSA exists under
Kansas common law, we must find not only that a public policy exists to support such an action, but
also that a claimant has no adequate alternative remedy under state or federal statutory law.");
Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (W.D. Mich. 2004) ("Under Michigan
law [] an express statutory prohibition and remedy are exclusive and preclude a common law public
policy claim.").
270.

See RESTATEMENT

§ 766B;

see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§4

(AM. LAW

INST. 1965) ("(T]he word 'duty' . . . denote[s] the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself
in a particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to another
to whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which that actor's conduct is a
legal cause.").
271. See Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.3d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985) (noting that "numerous cases
from other states recognize that there is no right of recovery on the part of a discharged employee
against one said to have interfered with a contract terminable at will").
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interference claims defy logic. An employer has the right to discharge
an employee at any time, even spitefully, so long as the discharge is not
otherwise unlawful. Yet, a coworker might be liable merely for
"improperly" harming a colleague's career. Thus, an employer may
have no liability if an executive with the authority to discharge a worker
does so simply because he hates the worker. But if Mindy's poor
evaluations of Ryan were hate-driven, Ryan arguably has a claim against

her.272
Mindy's obligation to Ryan (not to act improperly) not only
surpasses TD & Co.'s obligation (not to act unlawfully), but Mindy may
be liable for workplace actions of far less consequence than those
required for a claim against the employer. Ryan has no "wrongful
evaluation" claim against TD & Co., but his unsatisfactory ratings may
justify a lawsuit against Mindy.273 In other words, while the "thou shalt
not improperly interfere" standard does not apply to employers, it does
apply to coworkers.
These results, or risks, have a potentially dramatic impact on the
ability of managers and supervisors to manage their workers.2 74
Managing workers involves the exercise of judgment and opinion, and
impressions of workers may rely to a great extent on general notions
regarding an employee's "fit." In smaller organizations particularly,
personal preferences and plain-old likability are significant. To suggest
that a coworker may be sued for the foolish, tainted, warped, or

272. Boers v. Payline Sys. Inc., 918 P.2d 432, 437 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) ("In Giordano, the
defendant fired the plaintiff simply because he did not want the plaintiff to work for the corporation.
He created false information in order to justify the firing. We held that that evidence was sufficient
to support a finding that the defendant had acted with an improper purpose.") (citing Giordano v.
Aerolift, Inc., 818 P.2d 950 (Or. App. 1991)).
273. See id Courts may view a claim against a coworker as an improper attempt to plead a
barred claim against the employer. See Barcellos v. Robbins, 858 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (noting that a bar on a wrongful discharge claim "cannot be circumvented by casting the
cause of action in terms of tortious interference with employment").

274. See Sheppard v. Freeman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 16-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Personnel actions are made for the benefit of the enterprise-the employer,
and it is the employer, not the individual employees, that must bear the risks
and responsibilities attendant to these actions. Naturally, personnel actions
are made with the input of employees, both as part of their official duties and
otherwise. Without such input, the employer would be making decisions and
taking action in a vacuum, and indeed, effective management and operation

of an enterprise to a significant extent depends upon the free exchange of
information, concerns, and ideas of all employees. This can hardly occur
when the individual employees face the prospect of being sued for this
conduct.
Id.
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downright unfair treatment of a colleague is to deny necessary
"breathing space."
"Important societal interests are served by
corporations having the clear and candid advice of their officers and
agents. Fear of personal liability would tend to limit such advice." 27 5
As discussed above, that is one reason some courts do not recognize
public policy claims against individuals.276
Intensifying this potential chilling effect is that coworkers lack
realistic contractual rights to define their obligations to coworkers and to
minimize the risk that they may be accused of a breach. Employers may
freely contract with workers, or their representatives, to define duties,
such as through executive employment agreements or collective
bargaining agreements. They may impose work rules. They may enter
contracts that restrict litigation options. For example, as a general rule
employers may require employees to arbitrate employment disputes,
depending on the type of claim.277 But an arbitration agreement between
Ryan and TD & Co. will not likely apply to Ryan's claim against
Mindy. 27 8 Should, or may, Mindy require every worker assigned to her
department to agree that any disputes between the two of them will be
resolved through arbitration? Although coworkers could enter into an
agreement that establishes legal duties between them, this is more
impractical than realistically plausible of being implemented. 2 79 Nor is
it clear what consideration a supervisor would offer to a subordinate to
275. Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tenn. 1994); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
439 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Mass. 1981). "The rule assigning liability to corporate officials only when their
actions are motivated by actual, and not merely implied, malice has particular force because 'their
freedom of action directed toward corporate purposes should not be curtailed by fear of personal
liability. . . ." Id. (citations omitted); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505-06
(Minn. 1991) ("To allow the officer or agent to be sued and to be personally liable would chill
corporate personnel from performing their duties and would be contrary to the limited liability
accorded incorporation.").
276. See, e.g., Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 506 ("[W]here we must balance a discharged
employee's need for a remedy against the concern not to chill company personnel in the
performance of their duties, we conclude, when motive or malice becomes relevant on the issue of
improper interference, that this malice be actual malice.").
277.

See, e.g., IV. Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

https://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
278. See Fenlon v. Burch, No. 4:15-CV-00185(JCH), 2015 WL 2374716, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May
18, 2015) (Burch's "only argument is that both [she and plaintiff] signed independent agreements
and that arbitration is therefore appropriate. The fatal flaw in Burch's argument is that no
agreement between the parties exists. Burch is therefore a nonsignatory of Fenlon's arbitration
agreement, and there must be some reason why she, although a nonsignatory, can enforce the
contract. Since the Court is presented with none, there is no basis on which to compel arbitration.").
279. See, e.g., id. (showing how two employees typically sign agreements with their employer
and not with each other). The court did not compel arbitration between the parties because no
reason was established as to why a nonsignatory could enforce an arbitration agreement. Id.
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make a contract limiting the supervisor's obligations enforceable.
C. Employment Interference Claims are Incompatible with the
Employment At-will Doctrine and Limitations on Public Policy
Claims
The compelling benefit of the at-will employment doctrine is that
either party remains free to end the relationship without further ado--no
muss, no fuss. 2 80 Neither party to the relationship is required to justify
its decision. If an employee, groomed over many years of service,
decides to work for his employer's arch-competitor, he may bid adieu.
Once courts append duties to the relationship, they risk making any
employment decision fodder for a lawsuit and significantly diminish the
benefits of at-will employment. 28 1 Recognizing this concern, the
Virginia Supreme Court recently held that the parties to an at-will
employment relationship have no obligation to provide advance notice
of termination of the relationship. 2 82 "Every decision to terminate an
employment relationship, or of an employee to quit a job, would become
a jury question-hardly the clear, flexible rule that the at-will doctrine
contemplates." 2 83
Claims dependent on the defendant's motive are particularly
incompatible with the notion of a "clear, flexible rule."284 As discussed,
in employment interference cases, motive is usually a key factor in
determining a coworker's standing as a third party and assessing whether
28
her conduct was improper.285 Inviting an assessment of motive,
however, effectively establishes a just cause standard for employee
discipline or discharge: If an unhappy employee cries "improper," the
defense will focus on the legitimate basis for the discipline or discharge;
in other words, it will attempt to prove the decision was "just." 286
280. Johnston v. William E. Wood & Assocs., Inc., 787 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 2016).
281. Seeid.
282. See id. at 105-06.
283. Id. at 105. But see Rachel Amow-Richman, MainstreamingEmployment Contract Law:
The Common Law Casefor ReasonableNotice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1513, 1544 (2014).
284. See Johnston, 787 S.E.2d at 105.
285. See Porter v. Oba, Inc., 42 P.3d 931, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
286. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386-87 (Conn. 1980). This is
not necessarily the case for public policy claims. See id. (citations omitted) ("'Just cause'
substantially limits employer discretion to terminate, by requiring the employer, in all instances, to
proffer a proper reason for dismissal, by forbidding the employer to act arbitrarily or capriciously.
By contrast, the plaintiff asks only that the employer be responsible in damages if the former
employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is
derived from some important violation of public policy.").
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Ryan's central argument is that he deserved higher ratings. Mindy
is not likely to persuade a jury simply by testifying, "No, he didn't."
She will be expected to justify each rating and withstand crossexamination designed to undermine her explanation. Mindy might have
convincing explanations, but why does this dispute belong in the
courtroom at all? The scenario that Ryan could easily sue Mindy,
persuade a court that the case must go to a jury because Mindy's motives
present a fact issue, and then hope that Mindy makes a lousy witness,
clearly would chill Mindy and similarly situated bosses from candid
evaluations of their subordinates.
Interference claims against coworkers likewise are hard to square
with limitations on public policy claims. 87 One reason that courts
hesitate to recognize or expand the application of those claims is that
case-by-case judicial recognition of public policies leaves employers at
the mercy of the courts. 2 88 "A vague or general statute" fails to support
public policy claims because "such vagueness would [] cause the duties
imposed upon employers [to] become more vague and create difficulties
for employers to plan around liability based on the vagaries of
judges." 2 89 Employment interference claims, based on vague notions of
impropriety, surely make it difficult for employers--or, more
specifically here, coworkers-to "plan around liability."
Public policy claims thus are restricted by the limitation that only
conduct contrary to a well-defined policy is actionable, such as conduct
that "strikes at the heart" of society. 290 Also, as discussed, some

287. See Sheppard v. Freeman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 15-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing
"the deleterious effects on business if disciplined employees may avoid [the requirements to state a
public policy claim against the employer] by simply alleging malice and suing coemployees for
damages on alternative tort theories, when the identical personnel action cannot give rise to tort

damages against the employer.").
288. See Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 595-96 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
289. Id. at 595-596 (quoting Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Northeast Northwest, 315 S.W.3d
342, 346-47 (Mo. 2010)) (en banc); see also Sheets, 179 427 A.2d at 483, 427 A.2d at 390 (Cotter,
C.J., dissenting) ("By establishing a cause of action, grounded upon 'intentionally tortious conduct,'
for retaliatory discharges which do not necessarily in and of themselves directly contravene
statutory mandates, the majority is creating an open-ended arena for judicial policy making and the
usurpation of legislative functions. To base this new cause of action on a decision as to whether an
alleged reason for discharge 'is derived from some important violation of public policy' is not to
create adequate and carefully circumscribed standards for this new cause of action but is to invite
the opening of a Pandora's box of unwarranted litigation arising from the hope that the judicial
estimate of derivation, importance, and public policy matches that of the plaintiff.").
290. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 56 (2016) (alteration in original) ("A public
policy cause of action exists when a discharge violates an interest that is 'fundamental,'
'substantial,' and 'distinctly public[';] will lead to an outrageous result clearly inconsistent with a
stated public policy and the community interest[; and] will strike at the heart of a citizen's social
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jurisdictions recognize only wrongful discharge public policy claims,
291
In contrast, Ryan
and lesser forms of discipline are not actionable.
even though the
Mindy
against
claim
interference
tortious
may have a
expressed
clearly
a
less
much
all,
at
policy
dispute involves no public
short of
well
is
harm
alleged
and significant one, and even though his
29
job loss. 92 Why go through the trouble of attempting to limit public
policy claims if the employer's agents may be sued for just about
anything that rattles a worker? 293
These concerns raise another issue, that of vicarious liability,
further discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. If a
coworker commits an intentional tort, her employer may be, as a general
rule, vicariously liable.294 That is why employers are sued for sexual
harassment committed by their agents.2 95 If TD & Co. is liable to Ryan
because Mindy intentionally harmed him by writing a negative
evaluation, neither the at-will doctrine nor the limitations constraining
the reach of public policy claims will be of any benefit. TD & Co. will
be vicariously liable even though employment laws have otherwise been
designed to limit Ryan's ability to sue the company. Vicarious liability
principles have "potentially momentous ramifications for employment
2 96
law, and especially for the employment-at-will-doctrine."

rights, duties, or responsibilities.").
291. See id.; see also Ludwig v. C & A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that if retaliation torts for actions other than termination were recognized, then

employers would be subject to lawsuits by disgruntled employees for all types of disciplinary
actions).
292.

See Long, The Disconnect, supra note 1, at 538 (noting that "to permit an interference

claim where the reason for the discharge is not actionable under a wrongful discharge theory would
be to undercut the default rule of employment at-will," and arguing that interference claims should
be permitted only where the coworker acted outside the scope of employment and where the
conduct was independently wrongful).

293.

In addition, precluding employment interference claims is desirable to "properly limit the

'piling on' of boundless non-statutory tort claims" in the employment context.

Freeman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 16 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
294.

See BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABLITY AND LITIGATION

Sheppard v.

§ 7:10 (2d.

ed.

2016); see, e.g., Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ind. 1994) ("[A]
corporation is chargeable with tortious intent when the individual who committed the tortious act

was acting pursuant to a policy or decision made through the corporation's regular decision-making
channels by those with authority to do so.").
295. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).
296. Cavico, supra note 70, at 524.
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D. Employment Interference Claims Impose Unclear Obligations
and are ParticularlyDifficult to Resolve
That a tort theory cannot be tidily applied may not itself justify its
retirement. Much of law is not neat, employing broad concepts ("gross
negligence") and dependent on the judgment of the reasonable man.297
Nonetheless, a tort claim is brittle if it is defined by vague notions of
wrongdoing ("improper"),.resolved by reference to vague interests (i.e.,
"nature" and "relations"), requires findings that cannot be made with
certainty (i.e., "motive" and "malice"), fails to offer clear advance notice
of obligations, and is decided against the "social norms" of jurors. 29 8 It
is surprising that such a tort should live on:
[S]ome claims seem impervious to even sustained and
potent criticism. One tort, for example, still "suffers
from considerable doctrinal confusion" long after its
inception. A commentator has written that "courts
[have] impose[d] liability under the rubric of [this tort]
in a variety of contexts, but they have failed to develop
common or consistent doctrines." Liability under this
theory hinges in large part on the tricky question of the
defendant's motive, creating knotty problems of proof.
The tort has produced enormous (and heavily criticized)
jury verdicts, with billions of dollars being awarded to
individual plaintiffs. Scholars have criticized the tort on
the ground that it deters efficient conduct while unduly
chilling free speech. . . . From all these facts, one might
conclude that this unnamed tort is in grave danger of
extinction. This is far from the truth, however, for the
tort is none other than intentional interference with
contract.2 99
One of the most significant shortcomings of claims for employment

297. See John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. REV. 563, 564
(2015).
298. See RESTATEMENT § 767; Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the
CollateralTorts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1693-95 (1996). The
author argues that the "more formless torts," including intentional interference with business
relations, should "disappear in the shadow of other, more specific doctrines in contract or tort law
relations." Gergen, supra note 298, at 1696-97.
299. Graham, supra note 250, at 377-78.
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interference, noted above, is the lack of advance notice of the extent of
obligations owed to colleagues. 300 This fault has several damaging
consequences: If coworkers do not know what "improper" interference
is, they may and will unwittingly cross the line. If the law does not
distinguish between right and wrong, courts will only infrequently
dismiss employment interference claims and instead will defer to jury
determinations as to impropriety. 301 And if no one really knows what
interests the tort protects, it clearly is an ineffective, if not defective,
means to promote societal interests.
Because improper-purpose findings are so dependent on
fact-finders' personal sympathies, and so insulated from
appellate review, the outcome of an improper-purpose
suit becomes unpredictable as soon as any evidence of
improper purpose is introduced. This is a problem not
merely because it may lead to unjust outcomes in
individual cases, but because it makes it impossible for
private parties to understand their rights and duties
under tortious interference law.302
The survey in Part H exposes the difficulty courts have in applying
tortious interference claims in coworker disputes. In particular, the
"third-party" inquiry is formulaic insofar as courts adhere to agincy
principles, unpredictable insofar as it depends on the defendant's
objectives and motives, and in a significant sense a fiction because the
workplace is a collaborative effort where coworkers are not individual
"parties," but participate in a common process to achieve a common
Countless enterprises tout teamwork as an uppermost
objective.
30 3
A
corporate value, as in, we are "one team [with] one dream."
discharge or discipline decision against an employee-which naturally
only impacts him in his capacity as an employee-is ultimately a
304
company decision.
300.

See Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and

Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1109-10, 1135-36 (1993); see also Graham,
supra note 250, at 384 ("[A] tort may be challenged as overly taxing to litigants and courts, failing
to generate predictable outcomes, producing divergent liability standards across jurisdictions, or as
an ineffective vehicle for developing optimal public policy.").
301. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553, 562-63 (Utah 2015).
302. Id.
NETWORK,
INFO.
L.
EMP.
Sample,
Discipline
Employee
303. See
http://www.elinfonet.com/pickedpol/45 (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
304. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (showing that a
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The focus in employment interference claims on motive not only
tests the claim's compatibility with the at-will employment doctrine, 3 05 it
is also a clumsy test for determining a coworker's standing as a third
party. Even the coworker accused of interfering is unlikely to be able to
bin all the factors that motivated the challenged employment decision.
Perhaps Mindy is a Second Amendment enthusiast and harbors
subconscious disdain for Ryan's off-duty advocacy of gun control laws.
Perhaps she is jealous of Ryan's colorful social life. Perhaps his
workplace ambitions are threatening to her. Yet some courts rather
breezily accept the argument that, if the plaintiff pleads that his
supervisor had a bad reason for the discipline or discharge, the plaintiff
has presented a factual question of whether the supervisor was a third
party.306
Indeed, the fact-intensive nature of tortious interference claims
typically precludes prompt resolution.307 It has been said that "the
central question to be answered is whether the defendant's conduct has
been fair and reasonable under the circumstances."30 s Even if fairness
and reasonableness were not questions of fact, "improper," "motive,"
"malice," and other elements certainly are: 3 0 9
Malice may be shown by the proof of facts from which

court will not interfere company's decision, unless employee rights are being violated).
305.

See, e.g., Mark R. Hinkston, Wisconsin Lawyer September 2001: Tortious Interference

with
At-will
Employment,
74
Wis.
LAWYER
(2011),
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=74&Issue
-9&ArticlelD=21799 ("[D]ischarged at-will employees should resort to a tortious interference
claim only when their termination actually was triggered by 'improper motive'.... .").
306. See Cohen v. Davis, 926 F. Supp. 399, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he plaintiff has
satisfied the third party element of a claim for tortious interference because she has alleged that the
defendants were not acting in good faith as employees of [employer] when they caused her
termination. The plaintiff claims that the defendants caused her termination to serve their own selfinterest because they wanted to prevent her from revealing possible financial improprieties, and that
the defendants used fraudulent means to effect her termination."); see also Giordano v. Aerolift,

Inc., 818 P.2d 950, 953 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("We conclude that there was evidence from which an
improper motive could be found. Although there was also contrary evidence, that evidence does not
compel a finding that defendant also acted to benefit [the employer].").
307. E.g., Clay v. Howard Univ., 82 F. Supp. 3d 426, 433 (D.D.C. 2015) ("Since the question
of individual liability is particularly fact-specific, the Court will defer ruling on the merits of [a]
motion.").

308. Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
309. Hayes v. Advanced Towing Servs., 40 S.W.3d 800, 803-05 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001)
("[W]hen there is room for different views, the determination of whether the interference was
improper or not is ordinarily left to the jury, to obtain its common feel for the state of community
mores and for the manner in which they would operate upon the facts in questions." (quoting
RESTATEMENT

§ 767

cmt. 1)).
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a reasonable inference of malice may be drawn. The
line between a proper inference and unwarranted
conjecture is not easily drawn. The answer depends on
the evidence in each case and on what the trier of fact
may reasonably infer from that evidence. The fact that
there is no direct evidence that [defendants] acted with
malice to obtain Gram's discharge is not dispositive.
There might be sufficient proof that spite or ill will was
the controlling factor in urging Gram's discharge,
derived from a "rational inference of probabilities from
3 10
established facts."

Accordingly, coworkers sued for employment interference likely
will endure laborious discovery at a minimum, if not a full-fledged trial,
before vindication is possible. 3 1 1 For example, even where the named
defendant was a founder of the company, the chairman of the board, the
chief executive officer, and a large shareholder of the closely held
corporation, the court concluded that issues of fact remained as to
whether he was a "third party." 312 While modem employment causes of
action may streamline resolution of the dispute through administrative
and other processes, employment interference claims introduce
coworkers to the messy, whole nine yards of litigation.
E. Statutory Claims Tailored to the Workplace and Other Available
Tort Claims are More Efficient and More Directly Address
Improper Conduct
In practice, and as Ryan's situation demonstrates, tortious
interference serves as a catchall cause of action in situations where
neither the courts nor legislature have afforded employment
protections. 3 13 Plaintiffs often assert them as tag-along claims in
3 14
As an appellate
complaints that may assert multiple causes of action.
judge once summarized:

310. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21,24 (Mass. 1981).
311. See, e.g., Harrison v. Netcentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622, 632 (Mass. 2001) (showing that
despite there being an abundance of evidence, the court still proceeded to harp on facts which drew
out the trial's length).
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Hayes, 40 S.W.3d at 800 (showing that tortious interference claims can be
brought as the sole cause of action).
314. See generally Gergen, supra note 298 (showing how multifaceted torts can be).
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Congress and the Washington Legislature have passed
legislation to eliminate discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, age, handicap and religion from the work
place. Additionally, there is detailed regulation of the
safety aspects of the work place and to protect union
activity by employees.
In view of this pervasive
regulation and in the total absence of any legislative
direction, I find it inappropriate for the courts to expand
the parameters of tortious interference to include
unsociable conduct of co-employees as a basis for such

a claim.3 15
As this quote suggests, comprehensive regulation is a rational basis
for refusing to recognize add-on tort claims. 1 Indeed, tort theories play
relatively little role in the expansive field of labor law because that field
is highly regulated.3 17
Whatever wild-west-free-for-all the at-will concept might conjure
up, private employment is comprehensively regulated.1 8
These
strictures limit the need for interference tort theories in the workplace:
The tort of inducing breach of contract, or interfering
with a contract, was never intended and does not apply
to the relationship between employer and employee. An
employee has a veritable arsenal of remedies against his
employer. Among other things, an employee has the
benefit of the Workmen's Compensation laws, fair
employment practices legislation, unemployment
compensation laws, collective bargaining agreements
and the general law affording damages for breach of
contract, all of which bear in various ways on hiring and
firing.3 19

315. Eserhut v. Heister, 812 P.2d 902, 905 (1991) (Forrest, J., concurring).
316. See Graham, supra note 250, at 373-74 (discussing how comprehensive regulation of
telegraph industry contributed to the demise of common-law tort claims for negligent transmission
of telegrams).
317. See id. at 374-75.
318. See, e.g., IV Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, supra note 277 (showing
how regulated private employment can be).
319. Tash v. Houston, 254 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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Legislation and other forms of workplace regulation permit
32 0 Causation
tailoring the scope of claims to the interests they foster.
As a common-law tort action,
standards provide an example.
32
interference is subject to common-law causation standards. ' Whether
applying that standard in a dispute between coworkers best promotes the
interests underlying tortious interference claims is an unanswered, and
For one thing, employment
apparently unconsidered, question.
cannot truly identify what
jurists
and
interference claims simply evolved,
322
jobsite interests the claim was "designed" to protect.
In contrast, legislatures and courts have pondered what causation
standards promote the interests underlying claims available against
to
employers. 32 3 Anti-discrimination laws might require an employee
3 24
a
or
basis,
prove that the protected characteristic was the "primary
325 in the alleged discriminatory act. If a statute does
"motivating factor"
not supply a standard of proof, courts may consider what standard best
32 6 For example, a
applies given the nature of the employment dispute.
recent California Supreme Court decision considered what the
legislature "sought to accomplish in enacting" employment
discrimination prohibitions and decided that to "give effect to" the
legislature's purpose, a plaintiff must show that discrimination was a
"substantial factor motivating" the employment decision.327 Courts in
jurisdictions recognizing public policy claims also consider what
causation standard is appropriate in light of the competing workplace
interests served by public policy claims-such as the "sole reason" or
"contributing factor" standards.32 8
320. See, e.g., IV. Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, supra note 277 (showing
how regulations can tailor how and what type of claims can be brought).
321. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pratt, 195 A. 205, 206 (Me. 1937). Traditionally, an employee
alleging that a third party interfered with his employment had to show that the harm would not have
occurred "but for" the interference. Id.
322. See, e.g., Yuan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 135 A.3d 519, 536 (Md. 2016).
323. See, e.g., Wells v. Franklin Broadcasting Corp., 403 A.2d 771, 773 (Me. 1979).
324. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1708 (West 2004).
325. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-104(b) (West 1998).
326. See, e.g., Walsh v. Town of Millinocket, 28 A.3d 610, 616-17 (Me. 2011) (showing that
in employment discrimination cases, plaintiff must show that discrimination "was a substantial,
even though perhaps not the only, factor motivating [the employment decision]"); see also, e.g.,
Wells, 403 A.2d at 773 (using a "substantial factor" causation standard "after careful consideration
of the purposes underlying the legislature's ban on age discrimination.").
327. Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 54, 59, 64 (Cal. 2013).
328. See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991) (recognizing a
"very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine under which a discharged at-will employee may sue
his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the
employee's refusal to violate the law"); cf Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371,
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True, judicial reasoning for selecting the causation standard
sometimes goes little beyond ipse dixit, as where an opinion declares
that a certain standard would better promote the underlying public
policy,329 or simply opts for a middle ground between more lenient and
strict causation showings. 3 30 As well, there has been no hue and cry that
traditional tort causation standards are ill-suited to employment
interference claims.331 Nonetheless, as it stands, employees are able to
plow ahead with suits against coworkers in which no one gives
particular thought to what causation standard should apply. 332
At some point in time, tortious interference claims against
coworkers perhaps served an otherwise unserved purpose. Modem
employment theories have created a sufficiently inhospitable
environment for employment interference claims that courts should pay
them their last respects and decree their passing. 333 "The original social
value of an action, however worthy and significant, cannot operate to
justify its continued existence in different times and under changed
social circumstances." 3 34
There is little argument that tortious
interference claims are effective to promote societal interests in
employment relationships without unduly impairing the interests of
employers and their workforces; or that they are the most efficient
means of achieving desirable objectives. 335 As has been said about
373 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) ("[T]o make a submissible case for retaliatory discharge ... an employee
must demonstrate his or her filing of a workers' compensation claim was a 'contributing factor' to
the employer's discrimination or the employee's discharge."); Davis v. Community Alts. of Wash.,
D.C., 74 A.3d 707, 710 (D.C. 2013) ("[W]e have repeatedly acknowledged the limited reach of this
tort and indicated that a plaintiff seeking recovery thereunder must show that her protected activity
was the predominant cause of her termination."); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d
81, 94 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) ("contributing factor").
329. See Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93 ("Employees would be discouraged from reporting their
employers' violations of the law or for refusing to violate the law if 'exclusive causation' were the
standard.").
330. See Allison v. Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle, 821 P.2d 34, 42 (Wash. 1991) ("Rejecting
both the 'to any degree' and the 'but for' standards of causation, this court instead requires plaintiff
to prove that retaliation was a substantial factor behind the decision.").
331. See, e.g., Timmer, supra note 244, at 1477 (stating, on the contrary, that if the court "truly
intended to base its adoption of the tort of interference .. . on the Restatement, then it must

officially adopt the section that is most essential to a proper application of the tort").
332. See id. at 1476 (discussing the elements of tortious interference with a business
relationship but failing to mention causation).
333. See Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Wis. 1978).
334. Id. at 600.
335. See id. at 600-01 (explaining that tort claims are sometimes denied due to ever-changing
public policy and the evolution of the master-servant relationship).
The historic common-law right of a master to recover for loss of services due
to a servant's injury by a negligent third party contemplated a quasi-familial
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emotional distress claims in the workplace, a tortious interference cause
of action "is not a particularly useful instrument to conduct the delicate
balance between employees' personal interests and employers'
economic interests that must be made when evaluating the legality of
employers' conduct." 3 3 6
Certainly, abolishing the claim of tortious interference in coworker
disputes will leave some unhappy workers without any claim.
Abolishing the claim is warranted not only because it is duplicative of
and in some ways inconsistent with other causes of action, but also
because these claims are based on unclear duties, they unduly impair the
broad rights to manage employees, and they are inherently difficult to
resolve. Even without an employment interference claim, employees
have access to other claims that have been tailored to workplace disputes
(e.g., discrimination) or address concrete wrongs (e.g., defamation).337

Of course, the law is not the only guard against workplace
unfairness. Internal policies and procedures almost always allow
recourse within the employer's organization. Larger organizations
typically have safeguards built into employment decision-making to
ensure that decisions are justifiable, such as internal management review
of proposed performance evaluations. 3 3 8 As a general rule, employers
have no desire for supervisors to incorrectly evaluate their subordinates'

relationship which does not exist between a modem-day employer and his
employee. The action, however valid in feudal societies, is out of place in
modem times. It is a carry-over from an earlier day, ill-adapted to current

social and economic realities, and should not be recognized under Wisconsin
law as a viable foundation upon which to base a claim for recovery of lost
earnings by an employer on account of negligent injury to his employee. Its
application to the normal present-day employer-employee relationship is
repudiated.

Id.
336. Duffy, supra note 257, at 414.
337. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69
WASH. L. REv. 361, 374 (1994). Although the model act's proposal requiring good cause for
discharge would preempt tort claims based on a termination, "[k]icking an employee on his way out
the door would still be actionable." Id. at 374-75.
338. See, e.g., Using ProperEmployee Termination Procedures,BIzFILINGS (May 24, 2012),
http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/sbg/office-hr/managing-the-workplace/employee-terminationprocedures.aspx (describing how an employer would be wise to follow the procedures that they
have previously laid out in the company handbook when terminating employees and any previous
documentation while reviewing the termination process).
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performance.3 3 9
This process will be imperfect; internal biases in favor of certain
employees, undue deference to mid-level management decisions, or
more pressing corporate priorities might lead to some inadequate
resolutions of workplace disputes. 34 0 Ryan may have attempted, without
success, to make his case that Mindy was unfair to him by seeking out
his human resources department or higher levels of management.
The judicial process for resolving disputes is also-at bestimperfect. In the end, "[t]he interest in allowing all employees the
freedom to act and speak in relation to personnel actions without the
threat of debilitating litigation outweighs the risk that a few employees
will act maliciously and go undetected by their employers."34 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

How should we pay our last respects to employment interference
claims? Some tort theories are slowly abandoned,3 42 but proactive
abolition would reset and define workplace expectations and duties far
more quickly. Legislative action is an option. Legislatures extinguish
workplace tort claims whenever they enact laws that provide exclusive
remedies, 343 but the judiciary need not await legislative abolition.
Courts have a continuing obligation to assess common-law precepts for
validity in light of present day realities. 3 4 Courts "have a 'charge to
keep,' but that charge is not to perpetuate error or to allow our reasoning
or conscience to decay or to turn deaf ears to new light and new life."345
339. See Sheppard v. Freeman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]t will behoove
the employer to be thorough in its investigation and analysis relating to personnel actions ... to
retain and reward good employees and to root out those who are dishonest or who act with ulterior
motives which undermine the effective operation of the company.").
340. Id. ("[Internal review] does not guarantee that some cases will not 'fall through the
cracks.' Some employees will be discharged or demoted based on incorrect or false information
from other employees that is not discovered by the employer through a good faith investigation, or
revealed through grievance procedures. However, this risk is outweighed by the vital need for all
employees to have the freedom to act and exchange information relating to personnel actions
without fear and risk of being sued.").
341. Id.
342. See Graham, supra note 250, at 387 (explaining that available alternatives to torts are
impacting their desirability, as alternative methods may be more effective).
343. See id. ("The advent of worker's compensation programs offers the paradigmatic case-inpoint of an alternative remedy displacing a tort.").
344. See Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (Ill. 1960) ("We find no wisdom in abdicating
to the legislature our essential function of re-evaluating common-law concepts in the light of present
day realities.").
345. Id. (quoting Brown v. Ga.-Tenn. Coaches, Inc., 77 S.E.2d 24, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953)).
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It is past time to retire tortious interference claims against coworkers
concerning workplace harms.
Now, in hypothetical two: Ryan decides to leave for a new job, but
Mindy tells his prospective employer that he was a below average
performer....
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